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GOVERNMENT ETHICS IN THE AGE OF TRUMP
Adam Raviv *

ABSTRACT
Americans’ trust in government officials has never been lower. Despite the
intense public focus on ethics in government in recent years, legal scholarship on
the subject has been sparse. This Article fills the gap by examining the ethics
regime of the federal executive branch in depth, with a discussion of both the
applicable ethics standards and the agencies and offices that are charged with
ensuring that government officials comply with those standards. The Article
describes how the current system heavily emphasizes prevention, education, and
highly detailed disclosures while it rarely enforces the law against wrongdoers. A
federal official in the United States is literally more likely to be struck by lightning
than to be charged with violating a government ethics law. The Article then
considers the federal government’s ethics regime through the lens of criminal
deterrence theory and concludes that the current system is an example of what not
to do if the goal is to discourage violations. To address this deficiency, the Article
proposes a number of reforms to the current system to improve the deterrent effect of
federal ethics standards, including a radical reimagining of the authority of
government ethics officials.
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INTRODUCTION
American trust in government has hit a low point. In 2019, just
seventeen percent of Americans agreed that they could trust the
government in Washington to do what is right most or all of the
1
time. This was not the result of a sudden, recent shift, as trust in
the federal government has steadily eroded ever since a peak after
2
9/11.
In particular, a 2014 Gallup poll found that seventy-five percent
of Americans agreed that “corruption [is] widespread throughout
3
the government in this country.” President Trump, of course, was

1. Public Trust in Government: 1958-2019, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Apr. 11, 2019), https:
//www.people-press.org/2019/04/11/public-trust-in-government-1958-2019
[https:
//perma.cc/2DS3-Q2YT]; see also Lee Raine, Scot Keeter & Andrew Perrin, Trust and Distrust
in America, PEW RSCH. CTR. (July 22, 2019), https://www.people-press.org/2019/07/22
/trust-and-distrust-in-america [https://perma.cc/5RTK-67BG].
2. See Public Trust in Government: 1958-2019, supra note 1.
3. 75% in U.S. See Widespread Government Corruption, GALLUP (Sept. 19, 2015), https://
news.gallup.com/poll/185759/widespread-government-corruption.aspx [https://perma.cc
/45WL-5YEF].
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elected in 2016 on promises to “drain the swamp” of corruption in
4
Washington. But a 2017 survey by Transparency International, the
international anticorruption organization, concluded that “rather
than feeling better about progress in the fight against corruption
over the past year, a clear majority of people in America now say
5
that things have become worse.” The following year, the United
States dropped in Transparency International’s international corruption rankings, as it was designated a “country to watch and
monitor” due to the finding that “[t]he country is currently witnessing threats to its system of checks and balances, as well as an
6
erosion of ethical norms at the highest levels of power.”
For all the concern about corruption and unethical behavior in
American government, it is not for lack of a set of express standards that officials are required to follow. On the contrary, an extensive mosaic of laws and rules governs the behavior of federal
employees. Nor, for that matter, is it for lack of substantial government resources devoted to ensuring officials comply with those
standards. A vast array of agency ethics offices, inspectors general,
and other officials throughout the government supposedly police
misbehavior as well as provide guidance and training on proper
compliance with the rules.
Part of the reason for this disconnect may be another disconnect: that between the extensive system of federal ethics standards
and offices and the extremely rare acts of enforcement against suspected violators. Despite the numerous laws and regulations, it is
very uncommon for a federal official to be disciplined in any way
for violating them, and the total number of such disciplinary actions has dropped steadily in recent years. And criminal prosecutions are orders of magnitude rarer, taking place only in the most
exceptional of cases. A federal official in the United States is literally more likely to be struck by lightning than to be charged with vio7
lating government ethics laws.
4. See, e.g., Ryan Lovelace, Trump Proposes Ethics Plan to ‘Drain the Swamp in Washington’,
WASH. EXAM’R (Oct. 17, 2016, 9:39 PM), https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/trumpproposes-ethics-plan-to-drain-the-swamp-in-washington [https://perma.cc/VZQ7-6QAS].
5. Corruption in the USA: The Difference a Year Makes, TRANSPARENCY INT’L
(Dec. 12, 2017), https://www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption_in_the_usa_the_
difference_a_year_makes [https://perma.cc/D8NL-6GJ5].
6. Americas: Weakening Democracy and Rise in Populism Hinder Anti-Corruption Efforts,
TRANSPARENCY INT’L (Jan. 29, 2019), https://www.transparency.org/news/feature/cpi-2018regional-analysis-americas [https://perma.cc/D39Z-TWM2].
7. The National Weather Service estimates that an American has a one in 15,300
chance to be struck by lightning in their lifetime. How Dangerous Is Lightning?, NAT’L
WEATHER SERV., https://www.weather.gov/safety/lightning-odds [https://perma.cc/PWC6H474] (last visited Nov. 4, 2020). As discussed below, approximately 10 federal employees
per year are subject to civil or criminal actions for violating ethics laws. See infra Part III. The
average federal employee tenure is 13.51 years. Profile of Federal Civilian Non-Postal Employees,
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This Article considers whether the current structure of ethics
rules and enforcement makes sense from a perspective of both deterring wrongdoing and encouraging public confidence in government. The Article concludes that the problem is not one of
substantive laws and rules—rather, it is a deficiency of process.
Given the vast public attention paid to government ethics, indepth scholarship on the subject has been surprisingly sparse in
8
the past decade. This Article aims to fill that gap by providing a
comprehensive overview of the structure of federal ethics regulation and enforcement and discussing possible reforms.
This Article will concentrate on the largest component of American government from both a fiscal and manpower perspective: the
federal executive branch. Although subject to many similar standards of behavior, and also the focus of considerable public attention, the courts, Congress, and state and local government will be
left for another day. Likewise, although federal lobbying law is a
key ethical standard, it primarily governs the activities of private
individuals and organizations communicating with government of9
ficials, while the focus here is on how the officials themselves are
restricted.

OPM
(Sept.
30,
2017),
https://www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/data-analysisdocumentation/federal-employment-reports/reports-publications/profile-of-federal-civiliannon-postal-employees [https://perma.cc/WEH5-WMHJ]. There are approximately 2.1 million civilian employees in the executive branch not including postal service employees. JULIE
JENNINGS & JARED C. NAGEL, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R43590, FEDERAL WORKFORCE STATISTICS
SOURCES: OPM AND OMB 6 (2019).
Accordingly, over the course of an average federal employee’s tenure, about 135 civilian executive branch employees—about one in 19,800—will be subject to an enforcement
action.
8. For counterexamples, see Alice Bartek-Santiago, Humanizing Federal Ethics: Motivating and Mobilizing Compliance Through Creative Outreach, 51 CREIGHTON L. REV. 713 (2018);
Claire Hill & Richard Painter, Compromised Fiduciaries: Conflicts Of Interest in Government and
Business, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1637 (2011); Kathleen Clark, Ethics, Employees and Contractors: Financial Conflicts of Interest in and Out of Government, 62 ALA. L. REV. 961 (2011); and RICHARD
W. PAINTER, GETTING THE GOVERNMENT AMERICA DESERVES: HOW ETHICS REFORM CAN MAKE
A DIFFERENCE (2009). In addition, the American Law Institute has been developing a set of
Principles of the Law on government ethics. The author is a participant in the Members
Consultative Group for this Principles project.
A notable, if narrow, exception to the limited recent scholarship on government ethics
is a minor explosion of commentary on the Constitution’s Emoluments Clause following the
election of President Trump. See, e.g., Kathleen Clark, The Lawyers Who Mistook the President for
Their Client, 52 IND. L. REV. 271 (2019); Don Mayer & Adam Sulkowski, The U.S. Constitution’s
Emoluments Clauses: How History, Behavioral Psychology, and the Framers’ Understanding of Corruption All Require an End to President Trump’s Conflicts of Interest, 7 BRIT. J. AM. LEGAL STUD. 257
(2018); Kimberly Breedon & A. Christopher Bryant, Restoring Trust with Trusts: Constructive
and Blind Trusts as Remedies for Presidential Violations of the Constitution’s Emoluments Clauses, 11
ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 284 (2018); Amandeep S. Grewal, The Foreign Emoluments Clause and the
Chief Executive, 102 MINN. L. REV. 639 (2017); Robert G. Natelson, The Original Meaning of
“Emoluments” in the Constitution, 52 GA. L. REV. 1 (2017).
9. See generally 2 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1614; Lobbying Disclosure Act Guidance, OFF. OF THE
CLERK, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (Jan. 31, 2017), https://lobbying
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Part I of this Article provides an overview of the key ethics standards that apply to federal executive branch officials and the three
sources they derive from: statutes, regulations, and presidential
ethics pledges. Part II describes the federal infrastructure that
oversees and enforces ethics standards. Part III discusses the methods of enforcement—regulatory, criminal, and otherwise—and the
extent of enforcement. Part IV addresses possible changes to the
current enforcement and compliance mechanisms. In particular, it
looks at the current ethics system through the lens of criminal deterrence theory and considers whether current processes and practices match up with what deterrence theory tells us are the most—
and least—effective ways to discourage wrongdoing and to promote public trust in government officials. This Article focuses not
on whether the current ethical standards are substantively good or
bad, but rather on whether the system is set up effectively to ensure
that government employees follow those standards.
I. THE FEDERAL ETHICAL STANDARDS
The disconnect between the federal government’s vast array of
ethical standards and the widespread perception that corruption in
government is endemic has been observed for decades. As one
commentator put it in 1990:
[O]ver-regulation of government ethics can be harmful to
the greater public interest, not merely unnecessary or burdensome to public employees. We may all lose when every
encounter with the government becomes an exercise in
narrow, “safe” conduct designed to prevent becoming personally trapped in a too wide, but tightly knit, prosecutorial
10
net.
Or, as Kathleen Clark put it nine years later:
While the amount of ethics regulation has increased, the
public’s trust in government has decreased. Adding more
ethics regulation actually may be counterproductive. It dis-

disclosure.house.gov/amended_lda_guide.html
[https://perma.cc/RL2P-MG75];
THE
LOBBYING MANUAL: A COMPLETE GUIDE TO FEDERAL LOBBYING LAW AND PRACTICE (Rebecca
H. Gordon & Thomas M. Susman eds., 5th ed. 2016) (providing an overview of federal lobbying law).
10. Beth Nolan, Regulating Government Ethics: When It’s Not Enough to Just Say No, 58 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 405, 414 (1990).
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tracts both government officials and the public from the
11
more general goal of protecting the public trust.
Or, as a government ethics lawyer himself complained a decade after that: “[T]here are numerous criminal and civil statutes addressing corruption and ethics, and there is an extensive and detailed
code of conduct for the executive branch that proscribes and prescribes employee conduct in minute and sometimes mind12
numbing detail.” Rather, as the lawyer continued:
The ever-present news reports of misconduct by government officials amply illustrate that the government’s coercive approach to ethics has neither prevented notorious
and outrageous corruption by government officials, nor reduced cynicism about government service. More likely, the
government’s heavily regulated workplace has led to what
[former Bush White House ethics head] Richard Painter
has described as “superficial compliance,” where employees
learn to navigate around the detailed rules instead of com13
plying with the broader ethical principles involved.
Ethics standards for federal executive branch employees derive
from three primary sources: statutes, regulations, and executive
orders. The key standards are summarized in this Part.
A. Ethics Statutes
The modern structure of federal ethics laws can be traced to
Congress’s enactment in 1962 of criminal statutes on bribery, conflicting financial interests, and other prohibitions. 14 In addition,
much of the current legal framework of government ethics derives
from the Ethics in Government Act of 1978, enacted in the wake of
15
Watergate. Among other things, the Act created the Office of
Government Ethics (OGE), which was in turn empowered to

11. K. Clark, Do We Have Enough Ethics in Government Yet?: An Answer from Fiduciary
Theory, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 57, 61–62.
12. James M. Lager, Overcoming Cultures of Compliance to Reduce Corruption and Achieve
Ethics in Government, 41 MCGEORGE L. REV. 63, 64 (2009).
13. Id. at 65–66.
14. Act of Oct. 23, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-849, 76 Stat. 1119; see also Memorandum from
Pres. John F. Kennedy to the Heads of Exec. Dep’ts & Agencies (Jan. 22, 1963).
15. Ethics in Government Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1824 (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 591–599); see also 35th Anniversary of the Ethics in Government Act,
U.S. OFF. OF GOV’T ETHICS (Nov. 8, 2013), https://oge.gov/Web/oge.nsf/Resources/35th
+Anniversary+of+the+Ethics+in+Government+Act [https://perma.cc/G8R7-YZRS].
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16

promulgate an array of ethics regulations. The 1978 Act also required federal officials to submit financial disclosure forms listing
17
their assets, income, and other information. Eleven years later,
Congress passed the Ethics Reform Act of 1989, which established
additional restrictions on, among other things, the activities of
18
former officials.
The primary federal ethics statutes, and the standards they enforce, are summarized below. The violation of these statutes subjects officials not only to employment discipline and civil penalties
but also potential criminal prosecution.
First, perhaps the key ethics statute for current executive branch
employees is 18 U.S.C. § 208, which governs financial conflicts of
19
interest. OGE has promulgated extensive regulations implement20
ing and clarifying the meaning and application of § 208. The
statute provides that, with certain exceptions, an official who
participates personally and substantially as a Government
officer or employee, . . . in a . . . particular matter in which,
to his knowledge, he, his spouse, minor child, general
partner, organization in which he is serving as officer, director, trustee, general partner or employee, or any person
or organization with whom he is negotiating or has any arrangement concerning prospective employment, has a financial interest,
21
is subject to criminal penalties. The law contains several excep22
tions, the most notable one since 2016 being that the President is
23
exempt from the law entirely.
Second, the supplementation-of-income statute, 18 U.S.C. § 209,
restricts federal employees from receiving—and private parties
from providing—additional salary or other income on top of the
official’s government pay. For example, a wealthy friend of an incoming federal official, proud of the friend’s willingness to serve in
public service and sympathetic to a civil servant’s relatively low pay,

16. 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 401(a), 402.
17. Id. §§ 101–112.
18. Ethics Reform Act of Nov. 3, 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-94, 103 Stat. 1716 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 2, 3, 5, 10, 18, 22, 26, 28, 31, 37, 41, 42 and 50 U.S.C.).
19. See generally Adam Raviv, Christopher Babbitt, Blake Roberts & Molly Jennings, Officials Must Note Financial Conflict of Interest Law, LAW360 (May 25, 2008), https://www.
law360.com/articles/1047300 [https://perma.cc/39E6-66TH] (discussing the application
of 18 U.S.C. § 208 to federal officials).
20. 5 C.F.R. §§ 2635.401–403, 2640 (2018).
21. 18 U.S.C. § 208(a).
22. Id. § 208(b); 5 C.F.R. § 2640.203–304 (2018).
23. 18 U.S.C. § 202(c).
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cannot give his friend an extra $50,000 per year on top of the employee’s government salary; under such an arrangement, both the
official and the wealthy friend would be violating § 209 even if the
friend neither seeks nor receives any official favors in return for
the salary bump.
Third, the key ethics statute that applies to former government
24
officials is 18 U.S.C. § 207, the so-called revolving-door statute.
25
The statute and its implementing regulations are aimed at restricting the post-government employment activities of former senior government officials and limiting their ability to profit from the
connections they made and the confidential information they
learned while in government. The statute contains various prohibitions, some of them time-limited and some of them permanent.
For example, the statute prohibits former officials from contacting
the federal government with respect to particular matters involving
26
specific parties on which they worked while in government; prohibits former officials from contacting the government for two
years on any matters that fell within their “official responsibility”
27
during their last year in government; prohibits certain “senior
personnel” from contacting senior officials at their former agen28
cies about any matter for one year after leaving government; and
extends a broader two-year restriction to certain “very senior” personnel, generally cabinet-level officers and very senior White
29
House officials. There are also restrictions relating to trade and
30
treaty negotiations and representing foreign governments.
Fourth, the Ethics in Government Act imposes significant financial disclosure requirements on federal officials. Senior executive
branch officials must file periodic reports that provide extensive
information on their financial holdings, sources of income, liabili31
ties, and transactions, along with those of their immediate family.
32
These reports are made publicly available. Less senior officials
must file confidential financial disclosure forms, which are some33
what less detailed.

24. See generally Christopher Babbitt, Thomas W. White & Blake Roberts, Considerations
When Hiring Executive Branch Employees, LAW360 (Oct. 25, 2016), https://www.law360.com
/articles/854042 [https://perma.cc/WN6K-BP36]; PAINTER, supra note 8, at 47–59.
25. 5 C.F.R. § 2641 (2018).
26. 18 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1).
27. Id. § 207(a)(2).
28. Id. § 207(c).
29. Id. § 207(d).
30. Id. § 207(b), (f).
31. 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 101–103; see also 5 C.F.R. §§ 2634.201–311 (2018).
32. 5 U.S.C. app. § 105.
33. See 5 C.F.R. §§ 2634.901–909 (2018).
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Fifth, two statutes restrict federal officials from privately repre34
senting others before the government. First, 18 U.S.C. § 203 prohibits any current government official from acting as a paid representative in any matter where the United States is a party or has a
direct and substantial interest—for example, by lobbying the government or acting as counsel to a private client in litigation where
35
the United States is a party. Similarly, 18 U.S.C. § 205 prohibits
any federal official from acting “as agent or attorney for prosecuting any claim against the United States” or acting “as agent or attorney for anyone before any department, agency, court, courtmartial, officer, or civil, military, or naval commission in connection with any [particular] matter in which the United States is a
36
party or has a direct and substantial interest.”
Finally, bribery is perhaps the archetypal example of public corruption, provides one of the Constitution’s grounds for impeach37
ment, and implicates the most basic and intuitive common notions of ethics in government. The federal bribery and gratuity
statute, 18 U.S.C. § 201, prohibits anyone from offering, and prohibits a public official from accepting, anything of value in return
38
for or because of an “official act.”
B. Ethics Regulations
Pursuant to its statutory authority granted in the Ethics in Government Act and elsewhere, OGE has promulgated, and periodically amended, extensive ethics rules for executive branch employees. OGE’s ethics regulations are codified primarily at 5 C.F.R.
§ 2635, which first took effect in 1993 and has undergone a number of amendments since.
Some of the key ethics regulations are summarized below. These
are in addition to the regulations that directly implement and interpret the separate ethics statutes.
The first subpart of OGE’s ethics rules outlines the basic obligations of public officials. It provides that every executive branch
employee “has a responsibility to the United States Government
and its citizens to place loyalty to the Constitution, laws and ethical
principles above private gain,” and that “each employee shall respect and adhere to the principles of ethical conduct set forth in

34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

See PAINTER, supra note 8, at 26–30.
See 18 U.S.C. § 203.
Id. § 205(a).
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
18 U.S.C. § 201.
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39

this section.” It then lists fourteen “general principles” that “apply
to every employee and may form the basis for the standards con40
tained in” the ethics regulations. These principles generally require employees to do their jobs diligently and honestly and avoid
conflicts of interest.
Second, OGE regulations generally prohibit various ways in
41
which officials might misuse their positions. For example, employees may not use their public office for private gain for themselves or others by, for instance, coercing others to give them fi42
nancial benefits or endorsing “products, services or enterprises.”
It also prohibits the equivalent of insider trading, through “a fi43
nancial transaction using nonpublic information.” Officials also
may not improperly use government property or use their “official
44
time” except to “perform official duties.”
Third, ethics rules restrict the ability of executive branch em45
ployees to solicit or accept “gifts” from certain sources. The federal gift rule, most recently amended in 2017, generally provides
that an employee may not solicit or accept a gift from certain
sources, or from anyone when the gift is “given because of the em46
ployee’s official position.” “Gift” is defined broadly under the rule
as encompassing “any gratuity, favor, discount, entertainment,
hospitality, loan, forbearance, or other item having monetary val47
ue.”
Fourth, OGE’s impartiality rule generally restricts officials from
participating in certain matters where they have a relationship with
48
someone who is or represents a party to that matter. In essence,
this regulation provides that an official normally should not participate in a particular matter involving specific parties where (1) the
matter will affect the financial interests of a member of the official’s household, or (2) someone with whom the official has a
“covered relationship” is or represents a party to the matter, if doing so would create an appearance of impropriety in the mind of a

39. 5 C.F.R. § 2635.101(a) (2018).
40. Id. § 2635.101(b).
41. See id. §§ 2635.701–705.
42. Id. § 2635.702. In 2017, White House counselor Kellyanne Conway ran afoul of this
rule when, during a Fox News segment, she spoke positively about presidential daughter
Ivanka Trump’s clothing line. See, e.g., Valentina Zarya, Kellyanne Conway’s Endorsement of
Ivanka Trump’s Clothing Line May Be Unethical, FORTUNE (Feb. 9, 2017), http://fortune.com
/2017/02/09/ivanka-trump-nordstrom-kellyanne-conway [https://perma.cc/3F2M-MU98].
43. 5 C.F.R. § 2635.703(a) (2018).
44. See id. §§ 2635.704, 2635.705(a).
45. See id. §§ 2635.201–206; see also PAINTER, supra note 8, at 16–26.
46. 5 C.F.R. § 2635.202 (2018).
47. Id. § 2635.203(b).
48. See id. § 2635.502(a).
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“reasonable person” with knowledge of the relevant facts and circumstances.
Fifth, OGE’s “extraordinary payment” regulation is effectively an
extension of the supplementation-of-income statute to payments
made before the official entered government. It provides that “an
employee shall be disqualified for two years from participating in
any particular matter in which a former employer is a party or represents a party if he received an extraordinary payment from that
49
person prior to entering Government service.” The regulation defines “extraordinary payment” as a payment worth over $10,000
that is made to an official “[o]n the basis of a determination made
after it became known to the former employer that the individual
was being considered for or had accepted a Government position,”
and “[o]ther than pursuant to the former employer’s established
50
compensation, partnership, or benefits program.”
Sixth, the “seeking employment” regulation provides that, with
certain exceptions, a federal employee “may not participate personally and substantially in a particular matter that, to the employee’s knowledge, has a direct and predictable effect on the financial
interests of a prospective employer with whom the employee is
51
seeking employment.”
Finally, ethics regulations restrict the ability of federal officials to
52
engage in certain activities outside their government roles. For
example, in a restriction similar—and perhaps somewhat redundant—to certain other regulations, an employee cannot “engage in
outside employment or any other outside activity that conflicts with
53
his official duties.” Presidential appointees and the other senior
officials face a more substantial restriction: Presidential appointees
cannot “receive any outside earned income for outside employment, or for any other outside activity, performed during that Pres54
idential appointment,” and other senior officials’ outside earned
55
income is highly restrained.
C. Presidential Ethics Pledges
On top of existing ethics statutes and regulations, recent presidential administrations have also issued executive orders that re49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id. § 2635.503(a); see also PAINTER, supra note 8, at 52–53.
5 C.F.R. § 2635.503(b)(1) (2018).
Id. § 2635.604(a)(1).
See id. §§ 2635.801–809.
Id. § 2635.802.
Id. § 2635.804(a).
See id. § 2635.804(b).
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56

quired senior officials to sign “ethics pledges.” The first was issued
by President Clinton in 1993 as Executive Order 12834, entitled
“Ethics Commitments by Executive Branch Appointees.” It included:
1. A five-year ban on former officials’ lobbying of their former
agencies;
2. A lifetime ban on former officials’ lobbying for or representing foreign governments or political parties in a manner
that would require registration under the Foreign Agent’s
Registration Act; and
3. A five-year ban on former government officials’ advising or
representing a foreign government, political party, or entity
57
when those officials participated in trade negotiations.
The day after he took office in 2009, President Obama issued
Executive Order 13490 and required all full-time political appointees in the administration to sign the Ethics Pledge it contained. In
signing the Obama Ethics Pledge, officials made the following
primary commitments, most of which were variations on or extensions of existing rules and laws:
1. Not to accept gifts from registered lobbyists or lobbying organizations;
2. For two years after entering government, not to participate
personally and substantially in any particular matter involving specific parties “that is directly and substantially related
to my former employer or former clients;”
3. Restrictions on the ability of former registered lobbyists to
take government roles in areas that they lobbied;
4. An extension of the one-year “revolving door” lobbying ban
under 18 U.S.C. § 207(c) to two years;
5. For officials leaving government, agreeing “not to lobby any
covered executive branch official or non-career Senior Executive Service appointee for the remainder of the Administration;” and
6. Agreeing “that any hiring or other employment decisions I

56. See generally JACOB R. STRAUS, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R44974, ETHICS PLEDGES AND
OTHER EXECUTIVE BRANCH APPOINTEE RESTRICTIONS SINCE 1993: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE,
CURRENT PRACTICES, AND OPTIONS FOR CHANGE (2017) (discussing ethics pledges in recent
administrations).
57. Exec. Order No. 12,834, 58 Fed. Reg. 5911 (Jan. 20, 1993).
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make will be based on the candidate’s qualifications, compe58
tence, and experience.”
On taking office in 2017, President Trump issued his own ethics
pledge for political appointees. Though announced with great
“drain the swamp” fanfare, Trump’s ethics pledge borrowed heavily from both the Clinton and Obama pledges. It essentially retained Clinton items #1 and 2 above and Obama items #1, 2, 3, and
59
60
6 and expanded them slightly in a few respects. Most significantly, the restriction on former officials lobbying senior officials for
the remainder of the administration was expanded to cover not
only direct lobbying but also “lobbying activities,” including be61
hind-the-scenes advice relating to lobbying. As of 2018, according
to OGE statistics, 2,559 officials had signed the Trump Ethics
62
Pledge.
In January 2021, as this Article went to press, President Biden
issued an Executive Order requiring political appointees to sign an
63
Ethics Pledge similar to the Obama Administration’s. And on the
final day of his presidency, President Trump rescinded the Executive Order establishing his own Ethics Pledge, thereby releasing his
former appointees from their continuing Pledge obligations, in64
cluding the five-year ban on lobbying their former agencies.
II. THE FEDERAL ETHICS INFRASTRUCTURE
Every law or rule is only as good as the mechanisms for ensuring
compliance and addressing violations. Each agency of the federal
58. Exec. Order No. 13,490, 74 Fed. Reg. 4673 (Jan. 21, 2009).
59. Exec. Order No. 13,770, 82 Fed. Reg. 9333 (Jan. 28, 2017).
60. For a comparison of the Obama and Trump ethics pledges, see Kathleen Clark,
Illusory Ethics: Trump’s Ethics Executive Order, 2017 U. ILL. L. REV. ONLINE (Apr. 29, 2017),
https://illinoislawreview.org/symposium/first-100-days/illusory-ethics
[https://perma.cc
/ND94-JBY6].
61. Exec. Order No. 13,770, 82 Fed. Reg. 9333 (Jan. 28, 2017) (restricting “lobbying
activities” as defined in the Lobbying Disclosure Act). The Lobbying Disclosure Act defines
“lobbying activities” as “lobbying contacts and efforts in support of such contacts, including
preparation and planning activities, research and other background work that is intended,
at the time it is performed, for use in contacts, and coordination with the lobbying activities
of others.” 2 U.S.C. § 1602(7).
62. U.S. OFF. OF GOV’T ETHICS, CY17 ANNUAL AGENCY ETHICS PROGRAM
QUESTIONNAIRE 5 (2018), https://www.oge.gov/Web/oge.nsf/accessdocs_summary-reports
(click “Summary Report (CY17) (PDF)”) [https://perma.cc/DY45-RBLX].
63. Exec. Order No. 13,989, 86 Fed. Reg. 7027 (Jan. 20, 2021), and:
https://www.bloombergquint.com/politics/trump-revokes-lobbying-ban-after-promising-todrain-the -swamp.
64. Justin Sink, Trump Revokes Lobbying Ban After Promising to ‘Drain the Swamp,’
BLOOMBERG NEWS (Jan. 20, 2021), https://www/bloombergquint.com/politics/trumprevokes-lobbying-ban-promising-to-drain-the-swamp.
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government has its own ethics officers; in addition, the OGE oversees ethics generally across the executive branch and issues government-wide ethics regulations such as those discussed in Section
I.B above. This Part describes the federal ethics infrastructure as
currently organized and operated—and the costs and burdens of
this regime.
A. The Office of Government Ethics
65

OGE was established by the Ethics in Government Act of 1978.
According to its implementing regulations, “OGE exercises leadership in the executive branch of the Federal Government to prevent
conflicts of interest on the part of executive branch employees and
66
resolve those conflicts of interest that do occur.”
OGE has about seventy-five employees and is headed by a director who is appointed to a Senate-confirmed, five-year term and re67
ports directly to the President. OGE also has a general counsel’s
office and various officials who communicate with other executive
branch agencies, Congress, and the public regarding ethics polices
68
and rules. In addition, OGE’s Compliance Division oversees ethics programs in executive branch agencies and manages aspects of
69
the executive branch public financial disclosure program.
Over the years, OGE has energetically implemented regulations
and practices that helped cement its leadership on ethics matters
70
throughout the executive branch. OGE employees frequently interface with ethics officials in agencies throughout the government
to discuss the interpretation and implementation of ethical stand71
ards. Among other things, they request and compile information

65. See generally Our History, U.S. OFF. OF GOV’T ETHICs, https://www.oge.gov/web
/oge.nsf/about_our-history [https://perma.cc/4KQR-4MLV] (last visited Dec. 28, 2020);
PAINTER, supra note 8, at 70–77.
66. 5 C.F.R. § 2600.101(a) (2018). For an overview of OGE’s function and selfdescribed mission, see U.S. OFF. OF GOV’T ETHICS, STRATEGIC PLAN: FISCAL YEARS 2018-22 1
(2018),
https://www.oge.gov/web/OGE.nsf/0/5F2BA63E1DDF407D852585B6005A1E14
/$FILE/Finished%202018-22%20Strategic%20Plan.pdf [https://perma.cc/SZS4-JY46].
67. See generally Organization, U.S. OFF. OF GOV’T ETHICS, https://www2.oge.gov/web/
oge.nsf/Organization [https://perma.cc/W3VN-QYM9] (last visited Nov. 1, 2020); U.S.
OFF. OF GOV’T ETHICS, CHIEF FOIA OFFICER REPORT FOR U.S. OFFICE OF GOVERNMENT
ETHICS 6 (2012), https://oge.gov/Web/OGE.nsf/Freedom%20of%20Information%20
Act%20(FOIA)%20Reports/7274A88249BA0DAF852585B6005A1587/$FILE/chief_foia_
ofcr_rpt_2012.pdf?open [https://perma.cc/8GWC-PKS9].
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. See generally 5 C.F.R. ch. XVI (2018).
71. See generally Mission and Responsibilities, U.S. OFF. OF GOV’T ETHICs, https:
//www2.oge.gov/web/oge.nsf/Mission%20and%20Responsibilities [https://perma.cc
/KTZ8-VWCT] (last visited Dec. 28, 2020).
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72

on agency ethics programs. OGE also issues numerous public le73
gal advisories on how ethics standards should be applied. Overseeing the executive branch financial disclosure program is also a
74
major component of OGE’s work.
OGE’s website makes clear what is—and is not—the agency’s
mission: “The U.S. Office of Government Ethics (OGE) does not
handle complaints of misconduct, nor does OGE have investigative
75
or prosecutorial authority. OGE’s mission is one of prevention.”
After the 2016 presidential election, OGE gained a higher profile than ever before. A few weeks after the election, OGE issued a
series of tweets from its official Twitter account that “congratulated” President-Elect Trump for his supposed decision to divest his
personal businesses (which he did not, in fact, do). In a tweetstorm
on the morning of November 30, 2016, OGE declared:
.@realDonaldTrump We can’t repeat enough how good
76
this total divestiture will be
.@realDonaldTrump Brilliant! Divestiture is good for you,
77
very good for America!
.@realDonaldTrump OGE applauds the “total” divestiture
78
decision. Bravo!
.@realDonalTrump As we discussed with your counsel, di79
vestiture is the way to resolve these conflicts.
.@realDonaldTrump OGE is delighted that you’ve decided
80
to divest your businesses. Right decision!

72. See id.
73. See Legal Advisories, U.S. OFF. OF GOV’T ETHICS, https://www2.oge.gov/web/oge.nsf
/Legal%20Advisories [https://perma.cc/6JCY-NF8E] (last visited Dec. 28, 2020).
74. See 5 U.S.C. app. § 106; 5 C.F.R. § 2634 (2018).
75. Where to Report Misconduct, U.S. OFF. OF GOV’T ETHICs, https://www2.oge.gov/
web/oge.nsf/Resources/Where+to+Report+Misconduct [https://perma.cc/8HMQ-DJQK]
(last visited Dec. 28, 2020).
76. U.S. Off. of Gov’t Ethics (@OfficeGovEthics), TWITTER (Nov. 30, 2016, 12:55 PM),
https://twitter.com/OfficeGovEthics/status/804020923519012864.
77. U.S. Off. of Gov’t Ethics (@OfficeGovEthics), TWITTER (Nov. 30, 2016, 12:55 PM),
https://twitter.com/OfficeGovEthics/status/804020923548303360.
78. U.S. Off. of Gov’t Ethics (@OfficeGovEthics), TWITTER (Nov. 30, 2016, 12:55 PM),
https://twitter.com/OfficeGovEthics/status/804020923703533568.
79. U.S. Off. of Gov’t Ethics (@OfficeGovEthics), TWITTER (Nov. 30, 2016, 12:55 PM),
https://twitter.com/OfficeGovEthics/status/804020923800158209.
80. U.S. Off. of Gov’t Ethics (@OfficeGovEthics), TWITTER (Nov. 30, 2016, 12:55 PM),
https://twitter.com/OfficeGovEthics/status/804020924089438208.
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.@realDonaldTrump Bravo! Only way to resolve these con81
flicts of interest is to divest . Good call!
.@realDonaldTrump this aligns with OGE opinion that
82
POTUS should act as if 18 USC 208 applies. . . .
.@realDonaldTrump this divestiture does what handing
83
over control could never have done.
.@realDonaldTrump - we told your counsel we’d sing your
84
praises if you divested, we meant it.
It is a matter of judgment whether the tone of these tweets was
encouraging or sarcastic. They were later revealed to have been
personally authored by OGE’s then-Director Walter Shaub, who
acknowledged they were deliberately written in the style of Presi85
dent Trump’s own tweets.
The outspoken Director was only getting started. At a forum
held at the Brookings Institution nine days before Trump’s inauguration, Shaub made a thirteen-minute speech in which he criticized Trump’s refusal to divest his personal businesses upon taking
office and the conflicts of interest that Shaub said would arise as a
86
result of this refusal.
OGE’s standoff with the new administration continued after
President Trump’s inauguration. In April 2017, OGE issued a data
call to all executive branch agency heads, Designated Agency Ethics Officials, inspectors general, and the White House. OGE sought
copies of ethics waivers and authorizations that had been issued to
political appointees over the previous twelve months, including
waivers granted under the financial conflict of interest statute, the
impartiality regulation, and the Trump and Obama ethics pledg-

81. U.S. Off. of Gov’t Ethics (@OfficeGovEthics), TWITTER (Nov. 30, 2016, 12:55 PM),
https://twitter.com/OfficeGovEthics/status/804020925171646464.
82. U.S. Off. of Gov’t Ethics (@OfficeGovEthics), TWITTER (Nov. 30, 2016, 12:55 PM),
https://twitter.com/OfficeGovEthics/status/804020925893054464.
83. U.S. Off. of Gov’t Ethics (@OfficeGovEthics), TWITTER (Nov. 30, 2016, 12:57 PM),
https://twitter.com/OfficeGovEthics/status/804021426311180288.
84. U.S. Off. of Gov’t Ethics (@OfficeGovEthics), TWITTER (Nov. 30, 2016, 12:57 PM),
https://twitter.com/OfficeGovEthics/status/804021427565395969.
85. Lisa Rein, Federal Ethics Chief Blasts Trump’s Plan to Break From Businesses, Calling It
‘Meaningless,’ WASH. POST (Jan. 11, 2017, 6:45 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com
/news/powerpost/wp/2017/01/11/federal-ethics-chief-blasts-trumps-plan-to-break-frombusinesses-calling-it-meaningless [https://perma.cc/65RR-EN6A].
86. Walter M. Shaub, Jr., Dir., U.S. Off. of Gov’t Ethics, Remarks at Brookings Institution (Jan. 11, 2017), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/20170111_
oge_shaub_remarks.pdf [https://perma.cc/F7SW-42Z5].
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87

es. In response to the data call, the Director of the White House
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) sent OGE a short letter
asserting that the data call “appears to raise legal questions regarding the scope of OGE’s authorities” and saying that the DOJ “may
need to be consulted . . . on the scope of the authorities underly88
ing OGE’s data call.” OGE responded with a ten-page letter that
characterized OMB’s letter as “requesting that [OGE] suspend its
inquiry into the practices of agency ethics programs and, separate89
ly, the activities of individual appointees.” The letter went on to
provide, in detail, OGE’s view of its authority to collect the re90
quested information from the White House. OMB’s Director responded with a letter saying the White House would provide the
requested information and denying that OGE’s authority to re91
quest that information had been questioned.
In July 2017, Shaub resigned as OGE Director, saying in an interview that “the current situation has made it clear that the ethics
92
program needs to be stronger than it is.” He was replaced as Acting Director by the then-General Counsel of the Office, and a full93
time Director was sworn in a year later.

87. Memorandum from Walter M. Shaub, Jr., Dir., U.S. Off. of Gov’t Ethics, to Chief of
Staff to the President, Agency Heads, Designated Agency Ethics Offs., Inspectors Gen. &
Appointees (Apr. 28, 2017), https://www2.oge.gov/web/oge.nsf/All%20Documents/5B5
DECAECCE6CB8185258110007ADC76/$FILE/PA-17-02.pdf?open [https://perma.cc
/FU5S-ZU98].
88. Letter from Mick Mulvaney, Dir., Off. of Mgmt. & Budget, to Walter M. Shaub, Jr.,
Dir., U.S. Off. of Gov’t Ethics (May 17, 2017), https://assets.documentcloud.org
/documents/3727995/OMB-Director-Mulvaney-Letter-to-Office-of.pdf
[https://perma.cc
/NC7W-ZQ4L]. The letter cc’d all agency general counsels and Designated Agency Ethics
Officials.
89. Letter from Walter M. Shaub, Jr., Dir., U.S. Off. of Gov’t Ethics, to Mick Mulvaney,
Dir., Off. of Mgmt. & Budget 1 (May 22, 2017), https://assets.documentcloud.org
/documents/3728657/OGE-Letter-to-OMB-Director-Mulvaney.pdf [https://perma.cc
/DT58-PF23].
90. See id.
91. Matea Gold, White House Relents in Fight with Ethics Office over Waiver Disclosure, WASH.
POST (May 27, 2017, 8:53 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/
wp/2017/05/27/white-house-relents-in-fight-with-ethics-office-over-waiver-disclosure [https:
//perma.cc/A5T7-5MNC].
92. Peter Overby & Marilyn Geewax, Ethics Office Director Walter Shaub Resigns, Saying
Rules Need to Be Tougher, NPR (July 6, 2017, 1:01 PM), https://www.npr.org/2017/07/06
/535781749/ethics-office-director-walter-shaub-resigns-saying-rules-need-to-be-tougher
[https://perma.cc/3KVC-66KX].
93. U.S. SENATE, 115 CONG., EXECUTIVE CALENDAR NO. 913 (2018),
https://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/executive_calendar/2018/07_12_2018.pdf [https:
//perma.cc/3CN2-J9LT].
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B. Agency Ethics Offices
The vast majority of ethics officials in the federal government
94
are not part of OGE but rather work in individual agencies. As of
2018, federal agencies reported 1,027 employees who spent at least
95
twenty-one hours a week performing “ethics program duties.”
Another 872 employees worked eleven to twenty hours a week on
96
ethics matters.
OGE regulations provide that “[e]ach agency head must appoint
a Designated Agency Ethics Official (DAEO). The DAEO is the
employee with primary responsibility for directing the daily activities of the agency’s ethics program and coordinating with the Of97
fice of Government Ethics.” The DAEO must generally be a senior official. For example, in agencies with at least 1,000 employees,
98
the DAEO must at least be at the Senior Executive Service level.
DAEOs and those under their supervision are responsible for a
wide range of ethics-related areas, including counseling agency
employees on ethics laws and regulations, resolving conflicts of interest, administering the public financial disclosure program, and
99
enforcing ethics laws and regulations. To back up the DAEO,
agencies also must appoint an Alternate Designated Agency Ethics
100
Official, or ADEAO. At most agencies, the DAEO or ADAEO
101
oversees the other ethics officials.
Most agency ethics officials, who are typically career civil servants, report directly or indirectly to agency general counsel, who
are normally political appointees. Richard Painter explains that
agency officials typically take a more conservative and cautious approach to ethics issues than their political appointee bosses, and
frequently get their way despite their subordinate relationship:
The dynamic between ethics officers and their general
counsels often resembles that between career and political
appointees elsewhere in the government. Agency ethics of-

94.
95.

See generally PAINTER, supra note 8, at 77–80.
U.S. OFF. OF GOV’T ETHICS, RESULTS FROM THE 2018 ANNUAL AGENCY ETHICS
PROGRAM QUESTIONNAIRE: A SNAPSHOT OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH ETHICS PROGRAM 10
(2019), https://www.oge.gov/Web/oge.nsf/accessdocs_summary-reports (click “Summary
Report (CY18) (PDF)”) [https://perma.cc/S9LS-HCZU].
96. Id. More than five thousand employees did some ethics-related work but less than
10 hours per week. Id.
97. 5 C.F.R. § 2638.104(a) (2018).
98. Id. § 2638.104(b)(4).
99. Id. § 2638.104(c).
100. Id. § 2638.104(d).
101. U.S. OFF. OF GOV’T ETHICS, supra note 95 (summing the total number of agency
ethics officials in the executive branch).
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ficials will usually be in the government long after the departure of the political appointees to whom they report.
They typically have a conservative approach to interpreting
legal rules, a tendency to cast prohibition broadly and interpret exceptions narrowly and a strong preference for
avoiding the appearance of impropriety. They may be less
likely than lawyers who are political appointees, to give decision makers the widest possible latitude. Most political
appointees, nonetheless, are reluctant to overrule ethics officers because of the potentially high political cost of reject102
ing ethics advice and being wrong.
Agency ethics officials do not, however, deal with every policy and
personnel matter that could implicate ethical questions. Such topics as “preservation of email and other records, . . . handling of
classified information including the identity of covert intelligence
operatives, destruction of tape recordings and other documents,
coordination between agency officials and their paid surrogates in
the media, and the hiring and firing of political and career em103
ployees,” are generally outside the purview of ethics officials.
C. Other Officials Responsible for Ethics Breaches
In addition to OGE and agency ethics offices, other components
of the federal government also play an important role in the federal ethics infrastructure.
For example, as with other federal criminal violations, the DOJ
has sole authority to prosecute violations of the criminal ethics
statutes. It also has sole authority to bring civil enforcement actions
against violators. The frequency with which it exercises this authority and the process it follows are discussed below.
Agency inspectors general also play a key role in identifying ethics violations as part of their larger statutory mission to protect
104
agency integrity and efficiency. Because they tend to have greater
investigative resources and investigative authority than agency ethics offices, inspectors general offices frequently are on the front
105
lines of detecting—and publicizing—ethics issues.

102. PAINTER, supra note 8, at 77–78.
103. Id. at 79.
104. See generally Inspector General Act of 1978, Pub L. No. 95-452, 92 Stat. 1101 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. app. 3); Inspector General Reform Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110409, 122 Stat. 4302.
105. Disclosure: the author’s spouse is an investigative attorney with a federal inspector
general’s office.
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Finally, the U.S. Office of Special Counsel is a small independent agency focused on four statutes that apply to federal employees: the Civil Service Reform Act, the Whistleblower Protection
Act, the Hatch Act, and the Uniformed Services Employment &
106
Reemployment Rights Act. In 2019, the Office of Special Counsel
garnered rare front-page attention when it publicly recommended
that President Trump fire his counselor Kellyanne Conway after
identifying multiple violations of the Hatch Act, which restricts
public officials from using their official positions for political activi107
108
ties. The President declined to follow this recommendation.
D. The Burden of Compliance
This substantial federal ethics infrastructure creates considerable costs and burdens of compliance. Setting aside the money and
resources devoted to employing the thousands of ethics officers
across the government, employees subject to the rules are also
burdened. The largest, or at least most regularized, ethics-related
burden on federal employees is the annual financial disclosure reports each senior executive branch official must submit. As commentators have put it:
A great deal of effort is expended by government officials,
their lawyers, their agencies, and the OGE to determine
what does and does not have to be reported on the Form
278 and when investments such as hedge funds and private
equity funds have to be broken out on the form into their
component parts. For wealthy filers, often political appointees at the highest levels of government, Form 278 can be
109
dozens of pages long.
Or, in the words of Richard Painter:

106. See About OSC, U.S. OFF. OF SPECIAL COUNS., https://osc.gov/Pages/about.aspx
[https://perma.cc/VJ84-HJZP] (last visited Dec. 28, 2020).
107. OSC Finds Kellyanne Conway Repeatedly Violated the Hatch Act, Recommends Removal from
Federal Service, U.S. OFF. OF SPECIAL COUNS. (June 13, 2019), https://osc.gov/News/Pages
/19-10-Kellyanne-Conway-Hatch-Act.aspx [https://perma.cc/UU6Z-T7ZN]; U.S. OFF. OF
SPECIAL COUNS., REPORT OF PROHIBITED POLITICAL ACTIVITY UNDER THE HATCH ACT: OSC
FILE NOS. HA-19-0631 & HA-19-3395 (KELLYANNE CONWAY) (2019), https://int.nyt.com/data
/documenthelper/1169-osc-report-on-kellyanne-conway/11f2a2d73d1e14d197f3/optimized
/full.pdf [https://perma.cc/4GFY-PG3T].
108. John Wagner & Michelle Y.H. Lee, Trump Says He Won’t Fire Kellyanne Conway over
Hatch Act Violations, WASH. POST (June 14, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics
/trump-says-he-wont-fire-kellyanne-conway-over-hatch-act-violations/2019/06/14/76f31a948e9f-11e9-adf3-f70f78c156e8_story.html [https://perma.cc/E4ZC-947N].
109. Hill & Painter, supra note 8, at 1663–64.
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Ethics professionals at OGE and executive branch agencies
spend a lot of time determining whether long lists of investments held by wealthy officials and nominees are
properly disclosed, even when the likelihood that these investments would influence official decision making is ex110
tremely remote.
According to OGE, in 2018, federal employees submitted 25,935
public financial disclosure forms and 353,300 confidential finan111
cial disclosure forms. The “Public Burden Information” on the
relevant forms estimates that filling out public financial disclosure
form 278e takes an average of ten hours and filling out confiden112
tial financial disclosure form 450 takes three hours. By this calculus, in 2018, federal employees spent more than 1.3 million hours
filling out financial disclosure forms. One commentator has estimated that the total annual cost of complying with financial disclosure requirements, in terms of federal employee time, “could easily
113
exceed $5 billion.”
The financial disclosure program forms a major part of the work
of federal ethics offices. In a 2017 survey, thirty-four agencies said
that their ethics offices spent more than a quarter of their time on
the confidential financial disclosure program, and twenty-six said
114
the same about their public financial disclosure program. Likewise, financial disclosure ranked second, after gift acceptance, as
the ethics topic which agencies reported being asked about most
115
frequently.
Notably, former OGE Director Walter Shaub, who has been otherwise outspoken about how government ethics infrastructure is
116
not tough enough in many respects, has highlighted the excessive burden of financial reporting. In particular, he has argued that

110. PAINTER, supra note 8, at 15.
111. U.S. OFF. OF GOV’T ETHICS, supra note 95, at 23, 25.
112. U.S. OFF. OF GOV’T ETHICS, OGE FORM 278E (2020), https://www.oge.gov/Web
/OGE.nsf/OGE%20Forms?openview (select “OGE Form 278e (July 2020 508 PDF version)”) [https://perma.cc/PEY4-C54Z]; U.S. OFF. OF GOV’T ETHICS, OGE FORM 450 (2020),
https://www.oge.gov/Web/OGE.nsf/OGE%20Forms?openview (select “OGE Form 450
(Aug. 2020 508 PDF version)”) [https://perma.cc/M25U-WUN2]. A minority of confidential filers are permitted to fill out OGE-approved alternative forms, though the information
required to be reported is generally the same and the burden is unlikely to be substantially
different. U.S. OFF. OF GOV’T ETHICS, supra note 62, at 30. In addition, employees with no
new financial interests from a previous filing may fill out a short form called a Confidential
Certificate of No New Interests, form 450-A. In 2017, 50,014 employees filled out a form 450A. Id.
113. Lager, supra note 12, at 76.
114. U.S. OFF. OF GOV’T ETHICS, supra note 62, at 13.
115. Id. at 23.
116. See supra Sections II.A, IV.D.
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“Congress should eliminate the requirement to disclose income
117
from publicly traded assets registered with the SEC.”
Financial disclosure is not the only burdensome aspect of the
federal ethics compliance program. Federal regulations also require an ethics orientation for new employees in addition to annu118
al training. As James Lager argues: “Mandatory ethics training
about the rules, more properly termed ‘compliance training,’ is also very expensive, not just to pay for the trainers, facilitators, and
materials, but for the time public officials must spend to attend—
but not necessarily learn the content delivered in—annual ethics
119
presentations.”
III. ENFORCEMENT OF GOVERNMENT ETHICS STANDARDS:
METHODS AND PRACTICE
The federal executive branch ethics infrastructure devotes itself
overwhelmingly to compliance rather than punishment. As one
ethics attorney put it in a recent article, “the federal ethics pro120
gram focuses on prevention rather than enforcement.” Likewise,
former OGE Director Walter Shaub explains that “the existing eth121
ics program is, through and through, a prevention mechanism.”
In fact, government ethics attorneys have no direct authority to
penalize violators of the rules. Even if ethics officers have identified what they believe to be a violation, other components of an
employee’s agency, and possibly officials outside the agency, must
weigh in before any kind of administrative discipline or civil or
criminal liability is possible:
Neither agency ethics officials nor the OGE have authority
to enforce federal statutory and regulatory ethics laws. Instead, agency ethics officials refer potential violations to the
agency’s [Office of Inspector General] for investigation.
When employees violate the ethics laws, the OIG may rec-

117. Letter from Walter M. Shaub, Senior Dir., Ethics, Campaign Legal Ctr., to Trey
Gowdy, Chairman, House Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, & Elijah E. Cummings,
Ranking Member, House Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform 16 (Nov. 9, 2017),
https://campaignlegal.org/sites/default/files/W%20Shaub%20Legislative%20Proposa
l%20-%209%20November%202017_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/REF9-BPJF]
118. 5 C.F.R. § 2638.701 (2009).
119. Lager, supra note 12, at 75.
120. Bartek-Santiago, supra note 8, at 726.
121. Shaub, supra note 117, at 14.
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ommend disciplinary action or, if the violations carry crim122
inal penalties, refer matters to the Department of Justice.
This Part describes how federal ethics standards are designed to
be enforced and how often that actually happens.
A. Regulatory Enforcement Options
When compliance efforts fail, enforcement measures become
necessary. OGE regulations describe the administrative enforcement of violations of various ethics rules. Two overall types of enforcement are possible: “corrective action” and “disciplinary ac123
tion.”
“Corrective action” is the less severe of the two. It is defined
broadly as “any action necessary to remedy a past violation or prevent a continuing violation of this part, including but not limited
to restitution, change of assignment, disqualification, divestiture,
termination of an activity, waiver, the creation of a qualified diver124
sified or blind trust, or counseling.” Although some of these
measures might be unwanted, embarrassing, or inconvenient,
none of them amount to outright professional penalties.
“Disciplinary action” is potentially more severe. It “include[s]
but [is] not limited to reprimand, suspension, demotion, and re125
moval.” The most extreme possible outcome for a violation of
these regulations (assuming the conduct does not also violate a
criminal statute) is the employee’s termination. The only possible
financial penalty (other than a salary reduction resulting from a
demotion or suspension) is the corrective action of restitution for
ill-gotten gains.
Financial disclosure in particular allows for a variety of remedial
measures when a conflict has been identified. According to OGE’s
annual survey of federal agencies in 2018, 540 public financial disclosure filers “took specific remedial actions” because of infor126
mation on a report. These actions included “divestiture, resignation from outside position, written disqualification, 18 U.S.C. § 208
127
waiver, reassignment, etc.” The most common remedial actions
(which are not forms of discipline at all but rather preventive
measures) were recusal from particular matters, followed by divest122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

Bartek-Santiago, supra note 8, at 726.
5 C.F.R. § 2635.106(a) (2018).
Id. § 2635.102(e).
Id. § 2635.102(g).
U.S. OFF. OF GOV’T ETHICS, supra note 95, at 18.
Id.
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iture. Smaller numbers of employees resigned from outside posi129
tions, and 117 full-time employees received § 208 waivers.
Importantly, disciplinary and corrective actions are ultimately
the province of an employee’s own agency rather than OGE or
some other independent body. OGE’s regulations provide: “It is
the responsibility of the employing agency to initiate appropriate
disciplinary or corrective action in individual cases. However, corrective action may be ordered or disciplinary action recommended
130
by the Director of the Office of Government Ethics. . . .” So, the
more severe measure of “disciplinary action” can only be recommended by OGE, with the final decision made by the employing
agency. And at most, OGE can “order” the lesser corrective action,
but that action is ultimately implemented by the employing agency.
The applicable regulations also limit OGE’s own consideration
131
of potential violations. They provide that OGE’s “Director may
make such recommendations and provide such advice to employees or agencies as the Director deems necessary to ensure compli132
ance with applicable government ethics laws and regulations.”
In multiple places, the regulations contemplate that it will be a
“rare” case that an agency will fail to take action against an em133
ployee after OGE notifies the agency of possible misconduct.
Nonetheless, the regulations establish procedures when OGE “determines . . . that an agency head has not conducted an investigation within a reasonable time” notwithstanding OGE’s recommen134
dation that the agency conduct an investigation. But ultimately,
OGE’s actions are limited to (1) issuing “a nonbinding recommendation that appropriate disciplinary or corrective action be
135
taken against the employee;” (2) issuing “an order directing the
employee to take specific action to terminate the violation, provided that the employee has been afforded [notice] and an oppor136
tunity for a hearing” before an administrative judge; and (3) no137
tifying the President of the issue.
These alternative procedures are rarely used and exist more as a
theoretical safeguard when OGE determines that an agency has

128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

Id.
Id. at 18–19.
5 C.F.R. § 2635.106(b) (2018).
Id. §§ 2638.501–504.
Id. § 2638.503.
Id. §§ 2638.501, 2638.504.
Id. § 2638.504(a).
Id. § 2638.504(e)(2).
Id. § 2638.504(e)(3), (f), (g).
Id. § 2638.504(a), (e)(2).
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conspicuously failed to take proper action against one of its em138
ployees. Among other things, the process is only possible when
139
OGE has notice of a potential violation. An agency head who refuses to take disciplinary or corrective action may also be unlikely
to inform OGE of employee misbehavior.
The regulations also specify that OGE does not have the authority “to make a finding” as to whether a criminal law has been violat140
ed. This prohibition extends even to criminal statutes such as the
financial conflict-of-interest laws that empower OGE to issue implementing regulations. 141 Rather, if OGE’s “Director has information regarding the violation of a criminal law by an individual
employee, the Director will notify an Inspector General or the De142
partment of Justice.”
Nor, among the numerous guidance documents it has issued to
federal agencies, has OGE provided express recommendations on
what measures are warranted to address any types of violations.
There is no official—or even publicly available unofficial—
equivalent of sentencing guidelines for disciplinary or corrective
143
measures.
Agency ethics officials likewise cannot normally impose discipline themselves. Rather, they make recommendations to other
senior officials who have the final word on what action to take
against an employee. This division of power is borne out in the
144
regulations that govern DAEOs. The regulations specify a host of
responsibilities for an agency DAEO, but none authorize the
DAEO or other ethics officials to make a final disciplinary decision.
Rather, the DAEO is charged with “[a]ssisting the agency in its enforcement of ethics laws and regulations when agency officials . . .
145
[t]ake disciplinary or corrective action.”
Similarly, agency inspectors general cannot impose disciplinary
measures or take other action against employees who violate ethics

138. See id. § 2638.504 (providing that “[i]n the rare case” that OGE’s consultation with
agency ethics offices or individual officials do not resolve an issue, OGE itself may initiate
proceedings). OGE’s own description of the organizational structure of the executive
branch ethics program explains that potential violations “are primarily investigated by the
thousands of Inspectors General staff members across the executive branch.” U.S. OFF. OF
GOV’T ETHICS, supra note 66, at 2.
139. 5 C.F.R. § 2638.501 (2018).
140. Id. § 2638.502.
141. 18 U.S.C. § 208; see also supra Section I.A.
142. 5 C.F.R. § 2638.502 (2018).
143. See generally 5 U.S.C. § 6 (listing the authority of inspectors general).
144. See 5 C.F.R. § 2638.104(c) (2018).
145. Id. § 2638.104(c)(9)(ii) (emphasis added).
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rules and laws. Inspectors general can, of course, “conduct, supervise, and coordinate audits and investigations relating to the pro146
grams and operations” of their respective agencies. And unlike
OGE and agency ethics officials, inspectors general have subpoena
147
power and the power to take sworn testimony. But inspectors
general do not themselves carry out enforcement of violations.
They cannot require disciplinary action against any federal em148
ployee. And with regard to the “prosecution of participants in . . .
fraud or abuse,” all they can ultimately do is “report expeditiously
to the Attorney General whenever the Inspector General has reasonable grounds to believe there has been a violation of Federal
149
criminal law.”
B. The (In)Frequency of Employee Discipline
In 2018, federal agencies reported 1,077 “disciplinary actions”
based in part or in whole on violations of OGE’s “Standards of
Conduct” regulations. 150 This figure was lower than any prior annual number since OGE began compiling statistics. In fact, the
number of disciplinary actions dropped every year from 2011 to
2018. A chart of available numbers shows a steady pattern of de151
cline:

146. 5 U.S.C. app. § 4(a)(1).
147. Id. § 6(a)(4), (5).
148. See id. § 6.
149. Id. § 4(d).
150. U.S. OFF. OF GOV’T ETHICS, supra note 95, at 26. “Disciplinary action” was defined
for this purpose as “removals, demotions, suspensions, and written reprimands or their
equivalents.” Id.
151. Id.; U.S. OFF. OF GOV’T ETHICS, supra note 62, at 33; U.S. OFF. OF GOV’T ETHICS,
CY16 ANNUAL AGENCY ETHICS PROGRAM QUESTIONNAIRE RESULTS: A SUMMARY OF THE
EXECUTIVE BRANCH ETHICS PROGRAM 23 (2017), https://www.oge.gov/Web/oge.nsf
/accessdocs_summary-reports (click “Summary Report (CY16) (PDF)”) [https://perma.cc
/PV8F-9K64]; U.S. OFF. OF GOV’T ETHICS, CY15 ANNUAL AGENCY ETHICS PROGRAM
QUESTIONNAIRE RESULTS: A SNAPSHOT VIEW OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH ETHICS PROGRAM 23
(2016), https://www.oge.gov/Web/oge.nsf/accessdocs_summary-reports (click “Summary
Report (CY15) (PDF)”) [https://perma.cc/T9QZ-5WCQ]; U.S. OFF. OF GOV’T ETHICS, CY14
ANNUAL AGENCY ETHICS PROGRAM QUESTIONNAIRE RESULTS: A SNAPSHOT VIEW OF THE
EXECUTIVE BRANCH ETHICS PROGRAM 6, 23 (2015), https://www.oge.gov/Web/oge.nsf
/accessdocs_summary-reports (click “Summary Report (CY14) (PDF)”) [https://perma.cc
/F2YV-THPK]. In addition, for 2013, OGE published a “Highlights” document that included
a chart that did not provide exact numbers but showed larger numbers of disciplinary actions in every year from 2004-2013, including more than 3,500 in each of 2006 and 2009.
U.S. OFF. OF GOV’T ETHICS, THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH ETHICS PROGRAM ANNUAL AGENCY
QUESTIONNAIRE: HIGHLIGHTS CY 2013 5 (2014), https://www2.oge.gov/web/oge.nsf
/Resources/Annual+Agency+Questionnaire+%E2%80%93+Highlights+(CY+2013) (click on
“link to PDF version”) [https://perma.cc/Y9Q8-YW4Z].
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Of the disciplinary actions taken in 2018, by far the most common basis, comprising fifty-eight percent of the instances, was the
152
“misuse of position” rule. As discussed in Section I.B, that rule
can encompass such misdeeds as using public office for private
gain, use of nonpublic information, improper use of government
153
property, and misuse of official time. Many of these actions may
simply have involved people not working when they should have
been. For example, in 2016, the Patent and Trademark Office experienced a serious scandal involving time and attendance fraud by
154
patent examiners.
The second most common rule cited in disciplinary actions,
comprising thirty-two percent of actions, was subpart A of 5 C.F.R.
155
§ 2635. This subpart includes the fourteen “general principles”
of ethics that apply to government employees, and OGE’s survey of
agencies did not get more granular as to which particular principles were allegedly violated by the disciplined employees.
Because nearly ninety percent of disciplinary actions were based
on these two broad-based rules, the “misuse of position” rule and
the “general principles,” it is hard to ascertain exactly what the
most common type of sanctioned violation was. It is likely that
many of these disciplinary actions involved general misconduct of
the kind that could lead to discipline at any private or public

152.
153.
154.

U.S. OFF. OF GOV’T ETHICS, supra note 95, at 26.
5 C.F.R. §§ 2635.701–05 (2018).
See U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., REP. NO. 14-0990,
INVESTIGATIVE REPORT: U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE: ANALYSIS OF PATENT
EXAMINERS’ TIME AND ATTENDANCE (2016), https://www.oig.doc.gov/OIGPublications/140990.pdf [https://perma.cc/BP2C-AS4A].
155. U.S. OFF. OF GOV’T ETHICS, supra note 95, at 26.
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workplace—for example, not showing up for work, mistreating colleagues, or misusing the employer’s property—rather than violations of the standards that apply uniquely to federal employees.
The third most commonly cited basis for discipline of federal
156
employees was the restriction on outside activities. In contrast
with disciplinary actions based on the two above-mentioned rules,
disciplinary actions based on the rules restricting gifts, financial
conflicts of interest, the appearance of impropriety, or seeking
157
other employment were few and far between. For example, there
were twenty-three disciplinary actions based on outside gifts and
158
nineteen based on financial conflicts.
In addition, there were eighteen disciplinary actions taken for
violations of the criminal financial conflict statute, 18 U.S.C. § 208,
159
as opposed to the financial conflict regulations. Zero disciplinary
actions were taken for violations of any other criminal ethics provision. 160
Agencies’ own reports of the time that ethics officials spent on
enforcement confirm that it is a small part of their duties. OGE’s
2017 agency ethics offices survey asked agencies to rate, on a scale
of one to five, how much time they spend on various functions.
Out of 136 responding agencies, exactly one said that the time
161
spent on the “[d]isciplinary process for violations” rated a five.
By contrast, fifty-seven agencies gave a five to “[a]dvice and counseling” and twenty-seven agencies rated a five for both the
“[c]onfidential financial disclosure program” and the “[p]ublic fi162
nancial disclosure program.”
C. Ethics Pledge (Non-)Enforcement
For all the public attention they have received, presidential ethics pledges have proven a paper tiger when it comes to enforcement. The Obama and Trump ethics pledges included similar, limited enforcement mechanisms. First, anyone found to have violated
their pledge could, after notice and hearing, be barred from lobby163
ing their former agency for five years. (Such lobbying was pro-

156. Id.; 5 C.F.R. §§ 2635.801–09 (2018).
157. U.S. OFF. OF GOV’T ETHICS, supra note 95, at 26.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. U.S. OFF. OF GOV’T ETHICS, supra note 62, at 12.
162. Id.
163. Exec. Order No. 13,490, 74 Fed. Reg. 4673 § 5(b) (Jan. 21, 2009); Exec. Order No.
13,770, 82 Fed. Reg. 9333 § 5(b) (Feb. 3, 2017).
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164

hibited anyway by the Trump pledge. ) Second, the pledges empowered the DOJ to initiate a civil action against the violator in
which the government could seek (1) injunctive relief to prevent
further violations, and (2) “establishment of a constructive trust for
the benefit of the United States” that required the offending official to disgorge whatever income the official earned through the
165
violation of his pledge obligations.
As of this writing, the grand total of enforcement actions of any
kind taken against violators of either the Obama or Trump ethics
166
pledges is zero. There have been no actions to bar a former official from lobbying his or her former agency for five years and no
167
civil actions seeking injunctive relief or a constructive trust. In
any event, the penalty for violating the ethics pledge would be, at
most, disgorgement of the profits the employee earned by breaching the pledge. So, other than reputational harm, the worst out168
come from a breach would, financially, be a net neutral.
Some critics of the Trump administration have argued that certain officials violated the Trump pledge. For example, Citizens for
Responsibility and Ethics in Washington argues that then-White
House advisor Steve Bannon, by communicating with his former
employer Breitbart News Network about its coverage of the administration, violated the two-year ban on participating in “particular
matters involving specific parties” where his former employer was a
169
On another occasion, Democratic Senator Sheldon
party.
Whitehouse suggested that EPA Assistant Administrator Bill
Wehrum, a former “energy industry lawyer,” violated the pledge by

164. Exec. Order No. 13,770, 82 Fed. Reg. 9333 § 1(1) (Jan. 28, 2017). As discussed
above, President Trump rescinded this requirement on his last day in office.
165. Exec. Order No. 13,490, 74 Fed. Reg. 4673 § 5(c)–(d) (Jan. 21, 2009); Exec. Order
No. 13,770, 82 Fed. Reg. 9333 § 5(c)–(d) (Jan. 28, 2017).
166. See, e.g., Dealing with Trump Administration Appointees? Watch Out for These Major New
Restrictions in the “Drain the Swamp” Executive Order, COVINGTON ALERT (Jan. 31, 2017), https:
//www.cov.com/-/media/files/corporate/publications/2017/01/dealing_with_trump_
administration_appointees_watch_out_for_these_major_new_restrictions.pdf (“As far as we
know, there were no enforcement actions brought against alleged violators of the Obama
Ethics Pledge. Whether that will be the case in the Trump Administration remains to be
seen.”).
167. See id.
168. The official would presumably also incur attorneys’ fees in connection with the litigation.
169. Letter from Noah Bookbinder, Exec. Dir., Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in
Washington, to Donald F. McGahn, White House Couns. (Mar. 30, 2017), https:
//www.citizensforethics.org/wp-content/uploads/legacy/2017/03/McGahn-Bannon.pdf
[https://perma.cc/BMM7-KQFU]; see also Lachlan Markay, Bannon May Have Violated Ethics
Pledge by Communicating with Breitbart, DAILY BEAST (Apr. 10, 2017, 2:01 PM), https:
//www.thedailybeast.com/bannon-may-have-violated-ethics-pledge-by-communicating-withbreitbart [https://perma.cc/K8B6-DYC4]. If CREW’s analysis was correct, Bannon’s actions
would also have violated the appearance-of-propriety regulation. See 5 C.F.R. § 2635.502
(2018).
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meeting with various former clients in his official capacity.
171
tion was taken against Bannon or Wehrum.

170

No ac-

D. Criminal and Civil Enforcement
The “nuclear option” when an ethics law has been violated is a
criminal prosecution or a civil enforcement action by the DOJ. The
potential penalties under most of the ethics statutes, including the
revolving door, financial conflict of interest, and supplementation
of income statutes, depend on whether the offense was “willful.”
Willful offenses can carry penalties up to five years, while non172
willful offenses are limited to up to one year of imprisonment.
Fines are available in either instance, and civil actions for penalties
173
up to $50,000 are also possible. Finally, reporting willfully false
information in a financial disclosure form can lead to up to one
year of imprisonment, and willfully filing false reports, or willfully
174
failing to file a report at all, can also lead to civil fines.
Federal law nominally requires executive branch agencies to report any violations of criminal law by agency employees to the DOJ:
Any information, allegation, matter, or complaint witnessed, discovered, or received in a department or agency
of the executive branch of the Government relating to violations of Federal criminal law involving Government officers and employees shall be expeditiously reported to the Attorney General by the head of the department or
175
agency. . . .
Federal ethics regulations also nominally require OGE to notify the
DOJ or an inspector general “[i]f the Director has information re-

170. Press Release, Off. of Sen. Sheldon Whitehouse, Whitehouse Calls Out Wehrum for
Flaunting Trump Ethics Pledge (Oct. 20, 2018), https://www.whitehouse.senate.gov/news
/release/whitehouse-calls-out-wehrum-for-flaunting-trump-ethics-pledge [https://perma.cc
/L975-L5S2].
171. Press Release, Off. of Sen. Sheldon Whitehouse, Senators Question Steve Bannon,
White House Ethics Official on Violations of Trump Ethics Pledge (Apr. 20, 2017), https:
//www.whitehouse.senate.gov/news/release/senators-question-steve-bannon-white-houseethics-official-on-violations-of-trump-ethics-pledge [https://perma.cc/M6YQ-KYBH]; Derek
Kravitz, The Trump Administration Says It Has Violated Its Own Ethics Pledge, GOV’T EXEC. (Oct.
23, 2019), https://www.govexec.com/management/2019/10/trump-administration-says-ithas-violated-its-own-ethics-pledge/160814 [https://perma.cc/39GR-9X8C].
172. 18 U.S.C. § 216(a).
173. Id. § 216(a), (b).
174. 5 U.S.C. app. § 104(a)(2).
175. 28 U.S.C. § 535(b).
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garding the violation of a criminal law by an individual employ176
ee. . . .”
It is uncommon for ethics officials to make criminal referrals,
and most referrals that do happen do not result in prosecution.
(The latter fact may well be a cause of the former.) In 2018, federal
agencies made fifty-six referrals to the Department of Justice (DOJ)
177
for potential violations of the ethics laws. Of those, three were
178
accepted for prosecution. The previous year, agencies made sixty-nine referrals to the DOJ, of which nine were accepted for prosecution. 179 Anecdotally, agency lawyers who have worked on referrals will say that DOJ will decline to prosecute in all but the most
clear-cut cases involving the most egregious actions.
OGE annually surveys and compiles information on prosecu180
tions and civil enforcement actions involving ethics statutes.
These surveys indicate that prosecutions are few and far between,
given the millions of federal employees who are subject to these
laws.
By far the most common type of enforcement action was based
on a failure of financial reporting. As discussed above, the reporting statute itself provides criminal penalties for “knowingly and
181
willfully” reporting false or incomplete information. DOJ, however, virtually never prosecutes a person criminally under this statute. Rather, prosecutions for reporting violations are brought under 18 U.S.C. § 1001, which generally prohibits false statements to
the government and carries more severe penalties than the finan182
cial reporting statute. From 2017 through 2019, the DOJ charged
eight government officials under this statute based on reporting
violations in their financial disclosures. The examples are instructive:
•

In the most high-profile case, Corrine Brown, a longtime
member of Congress, was alleged to have participated in a
“conspiracy and fraud scheme” in which she and others solicited donations for an educational charity with the false

176. 5 C.F.R. § 2638.502 (2018).
177. U.S. OFF. OF GOV’T ETHICS, supra note 95, at 27.
178. Id.
179. U.S. OFF. OF GOV’T ETHICS, supra note 62, at 34.
180. See Conflict of Interest Prosecution Surveys, U.S. OFF. OF GOV’T ETHICs,
https://www.oge.gov/web/oge.nsf/Resources/Conflict+of+Interest+Prosecution+Surveys
(last visited Jan. 7, 2020).
181. 5 U.S.C. app. § 104(a)(2).
182. The maximum prison sentence under the financial disclosure statute is one year,
while the penalty for violation of § 1001 is up to five years. 5 U.S.C. app. § 104(a)(2)(B)(i);
18 U.S.C. § 1001(a). The penalty under § 1001 can be up to eight years if the offense involves terrorism. 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a).
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representation that the money would be used “for college
scholarships and school computer drives, among other
causes.” In fact, more than $300,000 of the money was used
to hold events hosted by or honoring the Congresswoman.
Brown was charged with numerous counts of conspiracy,
mail fraud, wire fraud, concealment, and filing false tax returns, as well as failure to report income on her annual financial disclosure statement in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
1001. The case went to trial and she was convicted on
eighteen counts, including § 1001. She was sentenced to
five years imprisonment, plus restitution of $515,166.86
and ordered to forfeit $664,292.39. The conviction was
183
upheld on appeal.
An official in the Public Health Services/Indian Health
Services section of the Department of Health and Human
Services pleaded guilty to one count of violating § 1001 for
failing to disclose a $5,000 check she had received from an
Indian Health Services doctor. The doctor had been accused by multiple people of sexually abusing minors, and
the official was allegedly aware of the accusations. She was
184
sentenced to twelve months unsupervised probation.
A Securities and Exchange Commission employee failed to
disclose various options transactions he had made and the
gains from those trades. His failure to report these transactions violated not only federal financial reporting rules but
also additional reporting and conflict rules that applied to
SEC employees in particular. Both the DOJ and the SEC
brought actions against him. In the criminal action, he
pleaded guilty to violating one count of 18 U.S.C. § 1001.
He was sentenced to twelve months’ probation including
six months of home confinement, and fines and special assessments totaling $1,100. In the SEC action, he was ordered to pay restitution, civil penalties, and interest total185
ing just under $110,000.
A federal employee in Washington, D.C., was implicated in
a conspiracy to defraud a mortgage lender of $337,000. He
faced charges under various federal statutes and eventually

183. U.S. OFF. OF GOV’T ETHICS, LA-18-09, 2017 CONFLICT OF INTEREST PROSECUTION
SURVEY 9–10 (2018), https://www.oge.gov/web/oge.nsf/Resources/Conflict+of+Interest
+Prosecution+Surveys (click “2017 Conflict of Interest Prosecution Survey”)
[https://perma.cc/B5TX-4VA3] [hereinafter 2017 CONFLICT SURVEY]; United States v.
Brown, 947 F.3d 655 (11th Cir. 2020).
184. 2017 CONFLICT SURVEY, supra note 183, at 6–7.
185. Id. at 7–8.
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pleaded guilty to charges of bank fraud, aiding and abetting, and false statements in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001.
He was sentenced to imprisonment for twelve months and
186
one day and required to pay restitution.
A contracting officer with the Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention received payments from a company that
was seeking to do business with the agency, and the officer
approved a single-source contract. The officer also failed to
report any outside income on his annual financial disclosure statement. He pleaded guilty to two counts of violating § 1001 and was sentenced to three months imprison187
ment and other penalties.
A safety inspector with the Federal Aviation Administration
received over $15,000 in payments from an avionics company in return for tipping it off in advance of FAA inspections, providing confidential information on competitors,
and failing to report the company’s legal violations. The
inspector also failed to report those payments on his financial disclosure forms. A jury found him guilty of bribery,
false statements, and various other charges. He was sentenced to 75 months imprisonment and ordered to pay
fines, restitution, and special assessments totaling over
188
$160,000.
A contract specialist with the Department of State received
more than $500,000 in cash from the owner of a Turkish
construction firm in exchange for favorable contracting
decisions. He failed to report those payments on his financial disclosure forms. A jury found him guilty of bribery
and false statements, and he was sentenced to 87 months
189
imprisonment plus financial penalties.
A civilian employee with the U.S. Navy Public Works Department gave various types of favorable treatment to Navy
vendors in exchange for more than $850,000 in kickbacks.
He failed to report those payments on his financial disclosure forms. He was charged with bribery, violating 18

186. Id. at 8–9.
187. U.S. OFF. OF GOV’T ETHICS, LA-19-05, 2018 CONFLICT OF INTEREST PROSECUTION
SURVEY 9–10 (2019), https://www.oge.gov/web/oge.nsf/Resources/Conflict+of+Interest
+Prosecution+Surveys (click “2018 Conflict of Interest Prosecution Survey”) [https://
perma.cc/8LKS-S9XB] [hereinafter 2018 CONFLICT SURVEY].
188. U.S. OFF. OF GOV’T ETHICS, LA-20-05, 2019 CONFLICT OF INTEREST PROSECUTION
SURVEY 1–2 (2020), https://www.oge.gov/web/oge.nsf/Resources/Conflict+of+Interest
+Prosecution+Surveys (click “2019 Conflict of Interest Prosecution Survey”) [https://
perma.cc/D3Y4-EPPR] [hereinafter 2019 CONFLICT SURVEY].
189. Id. at 2–3.
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U.S.C. § 1001, and various other charges, and pleaded
guilty to conspiracy and tax charges. He was sentenced to
70 months imprisonment and ordered to pay restitution of
190
over $1 million.
These eight prosecutions have in common that none of them
involved simply a willful failure to accurately report financial holdings or income. Rather, they all evinced a broader pattern of criminality or corruption. Congresswoman Brown and the D.C. employee were implicated in large-scale fraudulent conspiracies, and
the financial reporting charge was just one of many they faced.
The public health official, the charges strongly suggested, was
bribed to look the other way by a doctor facing multiple abuse allegations. The SEC employee engaged in what was likely suspected
to be insider trading. And the CDC, FAA, and State Department
officials were, either explicitly or in essence, accused of bribery. In
each case, the financial reporting violation was incidental to the
larger offense.
The other 2017, 2018, and 2019 prosecutions and civil actions
against government officials based on government ethics statutes
involved a similar pattern:
•

•

•

190.
191.
192.

A Navy official was accused of conspiring with a contractor
to steer government contracts to it and received $86,000,
funneled through two other companies, for doing so. He
was charged with receiving an illegal gratuity under the
bribery and gratuity statute, a conflict of interest in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 208, and wire fraud conspiracy. He
pleaded guilty to the wire fraud charge and was sentenced
to three years imprisonment, supervised release, and $1
191
million in restitution.
A contracting officer for the Department of Agriculture
awarded a $22,500 contract to a company of which his wife
was a part owner. He pleaded guilty to violating § 208 and
was sentenced to three years’ probation and a $10,000 fi192
ne.
An engineer for a Navy maintenance center attempted to
conceal a financial relationship with a defense contractor
whose subcontracts he was involved in administering. He

Id. at 3.
2017 CONFLICT SURVEY, supra note 183, at 3–4.
Id. at 4–5.
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pleaded guilty to violating § 208 and was sentenced to
193
three years’ probation and a $10,000 fine.
A Bureau of Prisons employee was accused of acting as a
paid “consultant” to a company that paid him in exchange
for favorable treatment in the contracting process, including providing the company with nonpublic information
that helped it in the bidding process. The employee was
accused of violating 18 U.S.C. § 209, the supplementationof-income statute, as well as various other statutes relating
to fraud and contracting practices. He entered into a civil
settlement with the DOJ in which he agreed to pay
194
$50,000.
A civilian employee of the Army was responsible for overseeing the performance of a contract for hazardous waste
and materials management, while simultaneously acting as
an employee of the contractor itself. She was charged with
violating both 18 U.S.C. § 208 and 18 U.S.C. § 203, one of
the “representational” statutes, and pleaded guilty to the
latter charge. She was sentenced to probation and
195
$354,499 in restitution.
A special agent with Immigrations and Customs Enforcement was accused of using his position to facilitate the entry of an inadmissible alien and of accepting financial benefits from the alien for doing so. He was charged with an
array of offenses, including the “representational” statute
18 U.S.C. § 205. At trial he was convicted on multiple
counts and was sentenced to one year and one day in pris196
on.
An employee of the United States Postal Service was involved in awarding a power washing contract to a company
owned by her husband. She pleaded guilty to violating 18
197
U.S.C. § 208 and was sentenced to probation and a fine.
A civilian Defense Department employee was involved in
decisions affecting the finances of an information technology company owned by her husband, which was a departmental subcontractor. She pleaded guilty to violating 18
198
U.S.C. § 208 and was sentenced to probation and a fine.

Id. at 5–6.
Id. at 6. The company and its owner also agreed to pay a settlement of $2,475,000.
2018 CONFLICT SURVEY, supra note 187, at 1–2.
Id. at 2–3.
Id. at 4–5.
Id. at 5–6.
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An oceanographer with the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration was charged with violating 18 U.S.C.
§ 209, the supplementation-of-income statute, for receiving
payments from a Chinese university and using his position
at NOAA to benefit the university’s students. 199
An employee of the Food and Drug Administration helped
a company get selected as a vendor for building maintenance and janitorial work in exchange for payments and
various other benefits. He was charged with, inter alia,
bribery and violation of 18 U.S.C. § 208 and pleaded guilty
200
to a § 208 violation. He was sentenced to probation.
The head of a post office in Scotland County, North Carolina awarded a cleaning services contract to her husband.
She pleaded guilty to violating 18 U.S.C. § 208 and was sen201
tenced to probation.
An Air Force official simultaneously served as a paid consultant for an aviation company and recommended that
company as a subcontractor on a contract he oversaw. He
pleaded guilty to two counts of violating 18 U.S.C. § 208
and was sentenced to home confinement, probation, and
202
restitution.
A U.S. Navy captain secretly provided paid public relations
services to Malaysian defense contractor Leonard Francis,
including advising Francis on his dealings with Navy officials. As part of the Navy’s much larger “Fat Leonard”
scandal, the captain pleaded guilty to violating 18 U.S.C. §
208 and was sentenced to six months imprisonment and
203
other penalties.
A field examiner with the Department of Veterans Affairs
was assigned to assist a veteran in drafting a will and deceived the veteran into designating the examiner as the
sole beneficiary of the accounts in the estate, worth over
$680,000. The examiner was charged with an array of violations, including 18 U.S.C. § 208. A jury found him guilty

199. Id. at 7.
200. 2019 CONFLICT SURVEY, supra note 188, at 4.
201. Id. at 6.
202. Id. at 6–7.
203. Id. at 7–8; see also Geoff Ziezulewicz, Navy Captain Who Moonlighted as Fat Leonard’s
PR Man Is Going to Prison, NAVY TIMES (Feb. 8, 2019), https://www.navytimes.com/news
/your-navy/2019/02/09/navy-captain-who-moonlighted-as-fat-leonards-pr-man-is-headed-toprison [https://perma.cc/8A3J-XC4E].
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on all counts, and the court sentenced him to eight years
204
imprisonment.
Except for the last case, all of these cases amounted to accusations that an official was improperly favoring a company or individual to which the official had secret ties. In substance, these were
likely bribery cases where the government could not quite prove
the elements required under the bribery statute, 18 U.S.C. § 201,
or the defendant was able to plead down to a lesser charge. Again,
as with the financial-reporting violations, the financial conflict or
supplementation-of-income charge was incidental to what was perceived as more serious wrongdoing. It may be going too far to describe the ethics statutes violations as afterthoughts, but they were
plainly fallbacks and add-ons. They were the equivalent of Al Capone being prosecuted for tax evasion.
As with the 2017 and 2018 prosecutions discussed above, earlier
prosecutions under the financial conflict of interest statute, § 208,
focused on instances where the federal official did not merely have
a financial interest in a matter under their authority but clearly
abused that authority to give advantages to the financial interest.
For example:
•

•

•

A supervisor with the District of Columbia Water and Sewage Authority controlled a company that was paid to help
applicants seeking permits from DC Water; he then, in his
capacity as supervisor, approved and issued those permits
to his clients. He was sentenced to twelve months’ proba205
tion.
An assistant at the VA Medical Center requested that the
Medical Center purchase an antimicrobial dressing manufactured by a company that had offered her a job, and
whose distributor had paid her for consulting services,
even after receiving an ethics opinion advising her to recuse herself from such matters. She was convicted at trial and
sentenced to one year’s probation, including three months
206
of home confinement.
A Lieutenant Colonel and spinal surgeon for the U.S. Army was involved in a laundering and kickback scheme to

204. 2018 CONFLICT SURVEY, supra note 187, at 6.
205. U.S. OFF. OF GOV’T ETHICS, LA-17-08, 2016 CONFLICT OF INTEREST PROSECUTION
SURVEY, at 3–4 (2017), https://www.oge.gov/web/oge.nsf/Resources/Conflict+of+Interest
+Prosecution+Surveys (click “2016 Conflict of Interest Prosecution Survey”) [https://
perma.cc/XW5G-3LX9] [hereinafter 2016 CONFLICT SURVEY].
206. Id. at 4–5.

368

•

•

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

[Vol. 54:2

cause army hospitals to purchase surgical tools and spinal
implants from a company that was secretly paying him. He
pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 12 months imprisonment, another year of supervised release, and a $15,000 fi207
ne.
A postmaster in Wisconsin awarded contracts to a cleaning
business of which he was a part owner. He was sentenced
to one year’s probation and also agreed to pay $50,000 in a
208
separate civil settlement.
A civilian employee of the United States Army Research
Laboratories arranged to award contract business to a
company in which he and his wife were secretly involved.
He was sentenced to forty-two months imprisonment and
three years of supervised release. He was also ordered to
209
pay $750,000 in restitution.

In all of these § 208 prosecutions, the offender did not merely
“participate personally and substantially” in a matter in which he
210
or she “has a financial interest.” Rather, in each case, the official
affirmatively steered business to or otherwise helped a company in
which he or she had an interest. In most cases, the officials’ connection to the business in question was deliberately concealed. In
none of these cases was the effect of the official’s participation in
the matter neutral or negative as to the affected financial interest.
The financial conflict statute plainly prohibits personal and substantial participation in a matter likely to affect a financial interest,
even if the official’s participation does not actually benefit the financial interest. As discussed above, although the number of executive branch officials who are disciplined for violating the financial
conflict law is not particularly large, it dwarfs the number who are
211
criminally prosecuted. The lack of prosecution in such instances
raises the question whether the broader prohibition in the statute
is, as a practical matter, extraneous, when the only offenses that
lead to prosecution are those in which the official actually pursues
financial benefit for his or her interests. DOJ effectively treats the
statute as one prohibiting abuse of one’s government position for

207. Id. at 6–7.
208. U.S. OFF. OF GOV’T ETHICS, LA-16-05, 2015 CONFLICT OF INTEREST PROSECUTION
SURVEY, at 5–6 (2016), https://www.oge.gov/web/oge.nsf/Resources/Conflict+of+Interest
+Prosecution+Surveys (click “2015 Conflict of Interest Prosecution Survey”) [https://
perma.cc/S3A9-4L8E] [hereinafter 2015 CONFLICT SURVEY].
209. Id. at 6–7.
210. 18 U.S.C. § 208(a).
211. See supra Section III.B.
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private gain, rather than the broader prohibition of conflicts of interest.
DOJ’s treatment of these cases suggests a recognition of a distinction between the appearance of impropriety and actual impropriety. Section 208 is designed not just to punish officials who use
their office for private gain, but also to avoid the decay of trust in
government that can result if officials are even allowed to be in a
position to potentially realize such gain.
2017, 2018, and 2019 were fairly typical years for ethics-law-based
prosecutions. An overall review of government ethics-related prosecutions and civil enforcement actions in the past decade is instructive. The chart below lists the number of prosecutions and civil enforcement actions based on OGE’s survey from 2010 through
212
2019:
Offense
18 U.S.C. §§ 203, 205 (acting as representative before government)
18 U.S.C. § 207 (revolving door statute)
18 U.S.C. § 208 (financial conflicts)
18 U.S.C. § 209 (supplementation of
income)
18 U.S.C. § 1001 (or 1018) (false reporting)
5 U.S.C. app. 4, § 104 (financial disclosure)

Total reported enforcement actions, 2009–18
6
9
52
9
25
3

212. 2019 CONFLICT SURVEY, supra note 188; 2018 CONFLICT SURVEY, supra note 187; 2017
CONFLICT SURVEY, supra note 183; 2016 CONFLICT SURVEY, supra note 205; 2015 CONFLICT
SURVEY, supra note 208; U.S. OFF. OF GOV’T ETHICS, LA-15-10, 2014 CONFLICT OF INTEREST
PROSECUTION SURVEY (2015), https://www.oge.gov/web/oge.nsf/Resources/Conflict+of
+Interest+Prosecution+Surveys (click “2014 Conflict of Interest Prosecution Survey”) [https:
//perma.cc/N25X-S7DG] [hereinafter 2014 CONFLICT SURVEY]; U.S. OFF. OF GOV’T ETHICS,
LA-14-07, 2013 CONFLICT OF INTEREST PROSECUTION SURVEY (2014), https://www.oge.gov
/web/oge.nsf/Resources/Conflict+of+Interest+Prosecution+Surveys (click “2013 Conflict of
Interest Prosecution Survey”) [https://perma.cc/QS67-U84T] [hereinafter 2013 CONFLICT
SURVEY]; U.S. OFF. OF GOV’T ETHICS. LA-13-12, 2012 CONFLICT OF INTEREST PROSECUTION
SURVEY
(2013),
https://www.oge.gov/web/oge.nsf/Resources/Conflict+of+Interest
+Prosecution+Surveys (click “2012 Conflict of Interest Prosecution Survey”) [https://
perma.cc/HL69-DHV8]; U.S. OFF. OF GOV’T ETHICS, LA-12-06, 2011 CONFLICT OF INTEREST
PROSECUTION SURVEY (2012), https://www.oge.gov/web/oge.nsf/Resources/Conflict
+of+Interest+Prosecution+Surveys (click “2011 Conflict of Interest Prosecution Survey”)
[https://perma.cc/Y8AV-HY22]; U.S. OFF. OF GOV’T ETHICS, LA-11-08, 2010 CONFLICT OF
INTEREST PROSECUTION SURVEY (2011), https://www.oge.gov/web/oge.nsf/Resources
/Conflict+of+Interest+Prosecution+Surveys (click “2010 Conflict of Interest Prosecution
Survey”) [https://perma.cc/6FBM-73RR] [hereinafter 2010 CONFLICT SURVEY].
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A total of 103 individuals, out of a federal workforce of over two
million, were subject to criminal or civil enforcement actions dur213
ing this ten-year period. The total number of actions stayed fairly
consistent from year to year, with no year during this decade-long
214
period having more than thirteen actions or fewer than seven.
The most common actions were for financial conflicts of interest
and for violations of the false reporting statutes based on financial
disclosures.
During this period the DOJ invoked the financial reporting statute in just three reported cases, as it generally preferred to prosecute financial reporting violations under the general false215
statements statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (or § 1018). In all three cases, the offense in question was not a false filing, but rather a willful
216
failure to file a required report. And all three cases were civil actions rather than criminal: In this ten-year period, the federal government brought no criminal charges under the financial disclo217
sure statute. Two of the three civil cases were settlements in
which the offender failed to file a termination report after leaving
218
government. The defendants were fined $1,000 and $4,000, re219
spectively.
The one fully litigated action under the financial disclosure law
was against an employee of Congress rather than the Executive
Branch. The employee, a former chief of staff for a member of
Congress, also refused to file a termination report when he left
220
Congress. He failed to respond to DOJ’s civil complaint against
him, and the court eventually entered judgment against him, re221
quiring him to pay a $25,000 penalty. And in 2019, the DOJ
brought a civil action against a former White House official who
failed to file a termination report: onetime Apprentice contestant
222
Omarosa Manigault Newman.

213. See sources cited supra note 212; Historical Federal Workforce Tables: Executive Branch
Civilian Employment Since 1940, OPM.GOV, https://www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/dataanalysis-documentation/federal-employment-reports/historical-tables/executive-branchcivilian-employment-since-1940/ [https://perma.cc/QHK8-NVNE] (last visited Dec. 28,
2020).
214. See 2013 CONFLICT SURVEY, supra note 212 (reporting thirteen new prosecutions for
violations of ethics statutes or for false financial disclosures); 2010 CONFLICT SURVEY, supra
note 212 (reporting seven new such prosecutions).
215. 2015 CONFLICT SURVEY, supra note 208; 2014 CONFLICT SURVEY, supra note 212.
216. See sources cited supra note 212.
217. See sources cited supra note 212.
218. 2015 CONFLICT SURVEY, supra note 208, at 11–12.
219. Id.
220. 2014 CONFLICT SURVEY, supra note 212, at 8–9.
221. Id.
222. Complaint at ¶ 1, United States v. Manigault Newman, No. 19-CV-01868 (D.D.C.
June 25, 2019).
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The relative lack of priority given to the criminal government
ethics statutes is also evident in the DOJ’s written guidance for
prosecutors. DOJ’s Justice Manual (formerly called the United
States Attorneys’ Manual) is a comprehensive document that con223
tains “publicly available [DOJ] policies and procedures.” It provides guidance on dozens of areas of criminal law, ranging from
copyright law to money laundering to employee benefit plan kick224
backs. The section on “Protection of Government Integrity” discusses bribery of public officials, interference with federally protected activities (for example, voter intimidation), campaign
finance laws, federal patronage crimes, election corruption, and
225
purchase and sale of public office. This section says nothing
about the financial conflict of interest law, the revolving door statute, or the other government ethics statutes.
DOJ’s even more extensive Criminal Resource Manual provides
prosecutors with summaries and guidance on hundreds of federal
226
criminal laws. Seven sections of the Criminal Resource Manual
227
deal with the federal bribery and gratuity statute. Zero sections
deal with other government ethics statutes.
E. Why So Little Enforcement?
There are at least three ways to interpret the disconnect between
the large regulatory apparatus of ethics compliance and the dearth
of active enforcement of these laws. The first is to conclude that
the system is working as intended: because many regulators are on
the job, providing guidance and policing employees, the number
of actual violations requiring disciplinary action or more severe
sanctions is relatively minimal. The second possible conclusion is
that the system is, in fact, overregulated: with so few apparent violations, the resources devoted to compliance are far greater than
necessary, and the system of compliance for things like financial
disclosure is far too burdensome. And finally, one may conclude
that we are in the worst of both worlds: Taxpayers fund an army of

223. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., JUSTICE MANUAL § 1-1.100 (2018), https://www.justice.gov/jm
/jm-1-1000-introduction [https://perma.cc/8AXK-Z9Q7].
224. Id. tit. 9, https://www.justice.gov/jm/title-9-criminal [https://perma.cc/9XHR9B2U].
225. Id. § 9-85.000, https://www.justice.gov/jm/jm-9-85000-protection-governmentintegrity [https://perma.cc/4X84-ZJ5M].
226. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., CRIMINAL RESOURCE MANUAL (2020), https://www.justice.gov
/archives/jm/criminal-resource-manual [https://perma.cc/3APZ-CR38].
227. Id. §§ 2041–47, https://www.justice.gov/jm/criminal-resource-manual-2001-299
[https://perma.cc/P7EN-3VQX].
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ethics officials throughout the federal government, but those officials fail to pursue more than a handful of violators.
It is impossible to know which one of these conclusions is the
correct one, or if some combination is at work. Is an ounce of prevention worth a pound of cure, or are there too many cops on the
beat?
At any rate, there is little reason to believe the few instances of
enforcement are an indication that ethics violations are uncommon. One study of corporate crime made the epistemological
point that “official observations are limited to illegal acts recorded
by enforcement agents and neglect those acts that do not come to
228
the attention of authorities.” Rather, it is most likely absence of
evidence rather than evidence of absence: Just because we do not
know of wrongdoing does not mean that it is not there.
Some comparisons with other agencies’ civil enforcement and
administrative actions may be an effective comparator:
•
•
•
•

The Securities and Exchange Commission filed 490
229
standalone enforcement actions in 2018 and 446 in 2017.
In fiscal year 2017, the EPA referred 110 civil enforcement
cases to the DOJ, filed 80 civil complaints in court, and
230
filed 1,220 administrative penalty order complaints.
In fiscal year 2018, the Federal Election Commission
231
closed 167 matters under review.
In fiscal year 2017, the Commodity Futures Trading Com232
mission (CFTC) brought 49 enforcement actions.

These numbers all dwarf the number of civil and criminal actions taken to enforce government ethics laws, even where—as with
a specialized agency like the CFTC—the universe of regulated parties is much smaller than the federal workforce. In 2017, there
were approximately 2,675,924 civilian employees in the federal ex-

228. Sally S. Simpson, Carole Gibbs, Melissa Rorie, Lee Ann Slocum, Mark A. Cohen &
Michael Vandenbergh, An Empirical Assessment of Corporate Environmental Crime-Control Strategies, 103 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 231, 234 (2013).
229. SEC, DIV. OF ENF’T, ANNUAL REPORT 9 (2018), https://www.sec.gov/files
/enforcement-annual-report-2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/LVH2-BDVU].
230. Enforcement Annual Results Numbers at a Glance for Fiscal Year 2017, EPA, https://
archive.epa.gov/epa/enforcement/enforcement-annual-results-numbers-glance-fiscal-year2017.html [https://perma.cc/D2GH-R9H2] (last visited Dec. 29, 2020).
231. FED. ELECTION COMM’N, ENFORCEMENT STATISTICS FOR FISCAL YEARS 1977-2018
(2018),
https://transition.fec.gov/em/enfpro/enforcestatsfy1975-2018.pdf
[https://
perma.cc/YF32-JY9N].
232. Press Release, Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, CFTC Releases Annual Enforcement Results for Fiscal Year 2017 (Nov. 22, 2017), https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom
/PressReleases/7650-17 [https://perma.cc/4NEV-GBUU].
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233

ecutive branch. Federal ethics regulations and statutes applied to
nearly all of them. Counting uniformed military personnel, to
whom the ethics statutes generally apply, the total number of ex234
ecutive branch employees jumps to 4,059,488.
Counting just the civilian employees, in 2018, fewer than one in
2,000 employees was disciplined in some way for violating federal
ethics rules. Of these incidents of discipline, as discussed above,
most of them likely involved general misconduct of the kind that
could occur at any workplace, rather than violation of the ethics
rules specific to the federal government.
A total of 167 disciplinary actions were taken for violation of the
restrictions on gifts, financial conflicts, impartiality in performing
235
official duties, seeking other employment, and outside activities.
This means that fewer than one in ten thousand civilian employees
was disciplined in 2018 for violating one of these rules. To put that
number in perspective, the U.S. Department of State has approxi236
mately 11,000 civil service employees. By this metric, exactly one
of them would have been disciplined in 2018 for one of these violations.
And of course, formal enforcement actions, in the form of civil
237
suits or criminal prosecution, were far rarer. In a federal workforce of more than two million, fewer than one in 200,000 executive branch officials per year is charged with any civil or criminal
violation under the government ethics statutes.
IV. THE PROBLEMS WITH THE CURRENT SYSTEM AND A
WAY FORWARD
As shown in Parts I and II, the federal government has an extensive system of ethical standards and a substantial infrastructure of
compliance-focused officials that imposes considerable costs and
burdens on the federal workforce. But as Part III demonstrated,
the consequences for violating these standards are few and far between.

233. JENNINGS & NAGEL, supra note 7.
234. Id. Enlisted uniformed military personnel are exempt from the general executive
branch ethics regulations. See 5 C.F.R. § 2635.103 (2018).
235. U.S. OFF. OF GOV’T ETHICS, supra note 95, at 26. The total number of individuals
disciplined based on violations of these provisions may have been lower because the same
person may have been found to have violated more than one of them.
236. Mission, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, https://careers.state.gov/learn/what-we-do/mission/
[https://perma.cc/U7RY-UX2W] (last visited Nov. 1, 2020).
237. See supra Section III.D.
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Ultimately, the federal tilt toward prevention and compliance,
and away from active enforcement, excessively burdens the officials
who are most likely to be compliant in any event while it minimizes
the deterrent effect on potential rule breakers. The officials who
pay scrupulous attention to bulletins from their agency DAEO, and
who call their ethics office for guidance on whether they can accept a particular gift, are not the ones who are likely to get into
ethics trouble. Rather, it is the employee who flies under the ethical radar that can create a problem.
This Part first assesses the current low-enforcement model of
government ethics from the perspective of criminal deterrence
theory. It then considers and proposes several possible reforms to
the federal government’s ethics regime to address the inadequate
deterrence created by the current system.
A. Enforcement and Deterrence
Laws and rules rarely enforced are unlikely to foster compliance.
As discussed in this section, voluminous scholarship on the deterrence of crime confirms that when (1) a particular type of crime is
rarely sanctioned, (2) there is no perception that that type of crime
is likely to be punished, and (3) any punishment that does happen
will only occur after a long and protracted process, then (4) deterrence is minimized. These factors all work against effective deterrence in the government ethics sphere.
1. Deterrence and the Certainty of Punishment
A great irony of the federal government’s sparse enforcement of
its ethical standards is that the government itself has acknowledged
that misconduct with a low probability of punishment is unlikely to
be deterred, even if the potential sanctions are severe. In 2016, the
DOJ’s National Justice Institute released a publication titled “Five
Things About Deterrence,” which summarized key research find238
ings on the topic. The stated purpose of the publication was “to
help those who make policies and laws that are based on sci239
ence.” Number one on the list stated: “The certainty of being
caught is a vastly more powerful deterrent than the punishment.
Research shows clearly that the chance of being caught is a vastly

238. NAT’L INST. OF JUST., FIVE THINGS ABOUT DETERRENCE 1 (2016), https://www.ncjrs.
gov/pdffiles1/nij/247350.pdf [https://perma.cc/V8T6-2883].
239. Id. at 2.
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more effective deterrent than even draconian punishment.” Item
number three said: “Police deter crime by increasing the percep241
tion that criminals will be caught and punished.” A supplemental
discussion explained that “it is the certainty of being caught that
deters a person from committing crime, not the fear of being punished or the severity of the punishment. Effective policing that
leads to swift and certain (but not necessarily severe) sanctions is a
242
better deterrent than the threat of incarceration.”
Deterrence scholars Daniel Nagin and Greg Pogarsky have similarly concluded: “punishment certainty is far more consistently
found to deter crime than punishment severity, and the extra-legal
consequences of crime seem at least as great a deterrent as the le243
gal consequences.” Another literature review found that “[t]he
current research, confirming earlier correlational and quasiexperimental studies, indicates that there are consistent and significant negative correlations between likelihood of conviction and
244
crime rates.” And a summary by Nagin explained that “[t]he perceptual deterrence literature consistently finds that perceived certainty of punishment is associated with reduced self-reported or in245
tended offending.”
Another literature review summarized the link between deterrence and certainty of punishment as follows: “Deterrence in general, whether contextualized as specific or general, depends on an
offender or would-be offender’s perceptions of sanction threats,
246
the probability of apprehension, and the like.” And one summary
of the relevant research concluded: “[I]n reviewing macrolevel
studies that examine offense rates of a specific population, the researchers found that an increased likelihood (certainty) of appre-

240. Id. at 1.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 2.
243. Daniel S. Nagin & Greg Pogarsky, Integrating Celerity, Impulsivity, and Extralegal Sanction Threats into a Model of General Deterrence: Theory and Evidence, 39 CRIMINOLOGY 865, 865
(2001).
244. ANDREW VON HIRSCH, ANTHONY BOTTOMS, ELIZABETH BURNEY & P-O WILKSTROM,
CRIMINAL DETERRENCE AND SENTENCE SEVERITY: AN ANALYSIS OF RECENT RESEARCH 47
(1999).
245. Daniel S. Nagin, Deterrent Effects of the Certainty and Severity of Punishment, in 7
ADVANCES IN CRIMINOLOGICAL THEORY 157, 158 (Daniel S. Nagin, Francis T. Cullen & Cheryl Lero Jonson eds., 2018).
246. Kelli D. Tomlinson, An Examination of Deterrence Theory: Where Do We Stand?, FED.
PROBATION, Dec. 2016, at 34. But see id. at 35 (“The impact of certainty of punishment for
criminal acts is just as murky as the research on severity of punishment. Some studies indicate perceived certainty of sanction threats has very little effect on re-offense rates, whereas
other research claims it does have an effect on some people but not others.” (citations omitted)).
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hension and punishment was associated with declining crime
247
rates.”
Another review specified that when the likelihood of punishment is low, deterrence is virtually nonexistent: “at a 10 per cent
punishment rate, almost no suppression [of wrongdoing] was ob248
served.” Importantly, it is the likelihood of apprehension—
almost regardless of the severity of the legal consequences—that is
a significant indicator of deterrent effects:
The empirical studies seem to agree that increasing the
probability of punishment provides a better chance of
strengthening deterrence than increasing the severity of
punishment. Establishing some base expectation of a meaningful chance of punishment is a necessary condition to any
deterrent effect. Yet, we have previously noted just how low
is the perceived probability of punishment—a perception
that results from the very low actual rates of punishment,
and is further exacerbated by the human tendency to heavi249
ly discount a future event.
For non-violent crimes, research also shows that certainty of apprehension is a significant deterrent:
People who perceive that sanctions are more certain tend
to be less likely to engage in criminal activity. Scenariobased research using self-reports that examine the effect of
certainty of punishment on individual behavior has shown
that as the perceptions of the risk of arrest for petty theft,
drunk driving, and tax evasion increases, individuals report
250
they would be less likely to offend.
Similarly, Nagin and Pogarsky surveyed college students to determine how different factors would affect their willingness to drink
and drive. They found that a ten percent increase in the likelihood
of sanction (whether a criminal penalty or a license suspension)
251
“reduces subjects’ probability of driving drunk by 3.3 [percent].”

247. VALERIE WRIGHT, THE SENT’G PROJECT, DETERRENCE IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE:
EVALUATING CERTAINTY VS. SEVERITY OF PUNISHMENT 4 (2010) (citing VON HIRSCH ET AL.,
supra note 244).
248. Paul. H. Robinson & John M. Darley, Does Criminal Law Deter? A Behavioural Science
Investigation, 24 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 173, 183 (2004).
249. Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Role of Deterrence in the Formulation of Criminal Law Rules: At Its Worst When Doing Its Best, 91 GEO. L.J. 949, 992–93 (2003).
250. WRIGHT, supra note 247, at 4–5.
251. Nagin & Pogarsky, supra note 243, at 877.
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2. Deterrence and the Speed of Punishment
The lengthy process of criminal prosecution also works against
deterrence: as one review put it, “a delay between violation and
punishment can dramatically reduce the perceived cost of the violation. Even if the punishment is certain, the more distant it is, the
252
more its weight as a threat will be discounted.” Or, as another
commentator explained: “Even a greater likelihood of being
caught will not have much impact in deterring a violation if the
timing of a prosecution is delayed long enough so that the miscre253
ant discounts the effect of any punishment.”
The “celerity” of punishment—”the criminogenic consequences
254
of how swift a punishment is implemented” —may also be a significant factor in deterrence. Although the evidence is mixed on
255
whether celerity is a consistent factor in criminal deterrence,
substantial amounts of research indicate that in controlled environments, it is a significant factor that may be applicable to the
256
wider world.
The problem is that, as scholars of celerity and deterrence put it,
“implementing celerity of punishment into the criminal justice system in a
257
meaningful way is a practical impossibility.” This is because “[t]he
criminal justice system is not built for speed.” 258
3. Deterrence and White-Collar Crime
When it comes to white-collar offenses in particular—which gov259
ernment ethics violations can properly be considered —
252. Robinson & Darley, supra note 249, at 954.
253. Peter J. Henning, Is Deterrence Relevant in Sentencing White-Collar Criminals?, 28 WAYNE
ST. L. REV. 27, 41 (2015).
254. Travis C. Pratt & Jillian J. Turanovic, Celerity and Deterrence, in 7 ADVANCES IN
CRIMINOLOGICAL THEORY, supra note 245, at 187.
255. See id. at 191.
256. See id. at 191–93.
257. Id. at 193.
258. Id.
259. The FBI describes white-collar crimes as follows:
[T]he term white-collar crime is now synonymous with the full range of frauds
committed by business and government professionals. These crimes are characterized by deceit, concealment, or violation of trust and are not dependent on the
application or threat of physical force or violence. The motivation behind these
crimes is financial—to obtain or avoid losing money, property, or services or to
secure a personal or business advantage.
White Collar Crime, FBI, https://www.fbi.gov/investigate/white-collar-crime [https://perma.
cc/83FB-3JTK] (last visited Nov. 1, 2020). One study of white collar versus other crime defined it as “planned crimes that involve cheating or lying that usually occur in the course of
employment.” DONALD J. REBOVICH, & JENNY LAYNE, NATIONAL WHITE-COLLAR CRIME CTR.,
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deterrence scholarship reaches the same conclusions. As two authors put it: “A wealth of studies suggest, perhaps especially in the
case of white-collar offenders but also more generally, that it is the
certainty of punishment, i.e., the certainty of being caught, that de261
ters more than the extent of punishment once caught.”
This conclusion is bolstered by a meta-analysis of studies on the
analogous subject of whether internal corporate codes of ethics are
effective deterrents to wrongdoing. The meta-analysis concluded
that “individuals agreeing with the statement that their companies
punish unethical behavior tend to work in companies that commit
262
fewer unethical acts.” In short, and unsurprisingly, the perception that unethical acts will be punished matters.
White collar crimes are especially difficult to deter because violators perceive the odds of getting caught as particularly low. An analysis of data from the National Public Survey on White-Collar Crime
conducted in 2000 concluded that “perceptions of sanction certainty were much higher for robbery (75 percent likely to get
263
caught) compared to fraud (22 percent likely to get caught).”
Moreover, the survey respondents were not uniform across demographic lines. In particular, the more educated and higher-income
respondents were less likely than others to believe that the white264
collar criminal would be caught. Similarly, a recent environmental crime survey posited that “[r]egulators may be able to discourage offending by publicizing actual cases of noncompliance or be265
yond-compliance behaviors.”

THE NATIONAL PUBLIC SURVEY ON WHITE-COLLAR CRIME 6 (2000), https://www.ncjrs.gov
/pdffiles1/Digitization/181968NCJRS.pdf [https://perma.cc/NU9B-FYX3].
260. See generally Natalie Schell-Busey, Sally S. Simpson, Melissa Rorie & Mariel Alper,
What Works? A Systematic Review of Corporate Crime Deterrence, 15 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y
387 (2016).
261. Carlton Gunn & Myra Sun, Sometimes the Cure is Worse Than the Disease: The One-Way
White-Collar Sentencing Ratchet, 38 HUM. RTS. 9, 12 (2011) (citing other literature); see also
L.E. Dervan, White Collar Overcriminalization: Deterrence, Plea Bargaining, and the Loss of Innocence, 101 KY. L.J. 723, 739–40 (2013) (discussing certainty of punishment and deterrence in
the context of white-collar crime).
262. Natalie M. Schell-Busey, The Deterrent Effects of Ethics Codes for Corporate
Crime: A Meta-Analysis 90 (2009) (Ph.D. dissertation, U. Md. College Park).
263. Andrea Schoepfer, Stephanie Carmichael & Nicole Leeper Piquero, Do Perceptions of
Punishment Vary Between White-Collar and Street Crimes?, 35 J. CRIM. JUST. 151, 157 (2007). In
particular, survey respondents were asked: “Who do you think is more likely to get caught by
the authorities, someone who commits robbery and steals $1,000 or someone who commits
fraud and steals $1,000?” Id. at 156.
264. See id. at 158–59 (“[E]ducation and income were robust predictors of certainty and
severity perceptions indicating that more educated respondents and those with higher incomes were more likely to perceive that street crimes, such as robbery, were more likely to
be detected and punished more severely than white-collar crimes, such as fraud.”).
265. Melissa L. Rorie, Sally S. Simpson, Mark A. Cohen & Michael P. Vandenbergh, Examining Procedural Justice and Legitimacy in Corporate Offending and Overcompliance: The Efficacy
of Direct and Indirect Regulatory Interactions, 40 L. & POL’Y 172, 184–85, 187 (2018).
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The conclusions of the reviewers of survey data from the National Public Survey on White-Collar Crime are also instructive:
More educated and wealthier individuals were less likely to
view white-collar crimes as being more certain of detection
and less likely to be punished than street crimes, especially
with regard to how they perceived the criminal justice system currently operated. Although this might be due to the
two crimes studied herein, one wonders whether this was
due to the fact that for white-collar/corporate employment,
(advanced) education tends to be a requirement. Or it
could be that more educated and wealthier individuals
happen to have more experience with the (successful)
commission of fraud and perceive that the crime goes
largely undetected.
. . . [T]he data revealed that those with greater education
and income perceived there to be less certainty and severity
of punishment for white-collar offenses than street crimes.
This suggested that those most likely to have access to
white-collar crime opportunities believed there was little
266
chance of getting caught and receiving a severe penalty.
The effectiveness of white-collar deterrence through regulation is
also questionable. A review of the deterrent effect of administrative
agencies on corporate crime concluded that
[i]f we take a strict definition of deterrence . . . , then the
threat of regulatory sanction and the subsequent fear that
derives from this threat are relatively miniscule. Reactive
enforcement, small budgets and staff, agency capture, few
punitive options, and so forth mitigate the likelihood that
firm illegality will be discovered (certainty) and harshly
267
sanctioned (severity).
Another, more recent review of corporate compliance with environmental standards observed that “[e]mpirical research findings
on the subject of large firm corporate environmental compliance
are inconsistent. Some studies show that regulatory activity (such as
monitoring and inspections) reduces corporate environmental
noncompliance, but others fail to find a deterrent effect or find
268
that deterrence matters only in certain settings.” Another study
266.
267.
268.

Schoepfer et al., supra note 263, at 160.
SALLY S. SIMPSON, CORPORATE CRIME, LAW, AND SOCIAL CONTROL 97 (2002).
Melissa L. Rorie et al., supra note 265, at 175 (citations omitted).
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of corporate environmental compliance found that internal compliance mechanisms do not affect compliance levels and “had no
269
significant impact on behavioral intentions.”
By contrast, one factor that has been found to contribute substantially to deterrence of corporate crime is the perceived risk of
270
informal sanctions such as reputational harm. Indeed, “informal
sanctions may be a more salient and direct influence on behavior
than formal sanctions.” 271 Of course, the converse is also true: authorities that lack the power or wherewithal to impose informal
sanctions will not have this deterrence arrow in their quiver.
A recent review of the literature on corporate crime deterrence
found that the most effective way to deter white collar crime is with
a combination of governing law, punitive sanctions, and regulatory
272
policy. And, in particular, regulatory policy was found to have
“produced a significant deterrent effect” when the policy in ques273
tion “provided for inspections/inquiries and enforcement.”
All that said, uncertainty abounds in this area. As one study observed: “Little is known about what works, what’s promising, and
274
what doesn’t in the prevention and control of corporate crime.”
4. Deterrence Theory and Government Ethics
This review of deterrence scholarship suggests that the current
system of ethics compliance and enforcement is, bluntly put, an
example of what not to do. An environmental crime study concluded that “[i]n general, the risk of environmental crime appears
least likely when there is a credible legal threat for noncompliance
and/or when one perceives informal consequences associated with
offending, such as losing the respect of one’s significant others, to
275
be certain and costly.” This is almost the exact opposite of the
reality facing government officials inclined to engage in wrongdo-

269. Simpson et al., supra note 228, at 263, 265.
270. See generally SIMPSON, supra note 267, at 106–11.
271. SALLY S. SIMPSON, DEBRA L. SHAPIRO, CHRISTINE M. BECKMAN & GERALD S. MARTIN,
PREVENTING AND CONTROLLING CORPORATE CRIME: THE DUAL ROLE OF CORPORATE BOARDS
AND LEGAL SANCTIONS 12 (2020), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/254622.pdf;
see also Simpson et al., supra note 228, at 261 (“Informal sanctions exert a strong inhibiting
effect on offending; individuals who perceive the informal costs associated with violating
environmental law to be more certain and severe are significantly less willing to violate.”).
272. See Schell-Busey et al., supra note 260, at 389.
273. Id. at 404.
274. SIMPSON ET AL., supra note 271, at 9; see also N. Craig Smith, Sally S. Simpson &
Chun-Yao Huang, Why Managers Fail to Do The Right Thing: An Empirical Study Of Unethical &
Illegal Conduct, 17 BUS. ETHICS Q. 633 (2007) (providing an overview of the literature on
corporate crime deterrence).
275. Simpson et al., supra note 228, at 266.
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ing. Despite an elaborate set of laws and rules, actual enforcement
actions are extremely rare. Because there is little reason to fear being caught and punished, the fear of consequences is accordingly
lessened. Though few government employees will have any idea of
the actual (low) number of criminal or disciplinary actions, they
will perceive little evidence of actual enforcement around them.
And because enforcement is so rare, most employees will not only
not know anyone personally who has been subject to enforcement,
276
they also will not know of any such person. Finally, ethics officials
have very limited authority to engage in the inspections and investigations that provide for effective regulatory deterrence or to take
277
actions that amount to informal sanctions.
Moreover, to the extent the speed of apprehension and punishment is a factor in deterrence, it is very much one that works
against the effectiveness of government ethics laws and rules. Of
course, the criminal justice system works no faster for government
ethics prosecutions than for other complex white-collar matters.
For example, the prosecution of Corrine Brown’s alleged criminal
278
conspiracy stretched back to 2012, but Rep. Brown’s sentence
did not begin until 2018. 279 The Securities and Exchange Commission branch chief discussed above pleaded guilty in 2017 to report280
ing violations that began in 2002.
Furthermore, even the more common non-criminal sanctions
for violations of ethics rules typically result from a long process.
Federal ethics officials—whether from OGE, agency ethics offices,
or inspectors general offices—cannot personally sanction employees even after they identify a violation. Rather, they must bring the
matter to the attention of the relevant supervisor, who must determine whether to take any action against the employee. In addition, an employee has a right to challenge adverse personnel actions through the Merit Systems Protection Board. Those cases, if
fully contested, typically take up to a year to reach resolution be-

276. For a discussion of the gap between actual punishment rates and perceived punishment rates, see generally R. Paternoster, Perceptual Deterrence Theory, in 23 DETERRENCE,
CHOICE, AND CRIME: CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES 81 (Daniel S. Nagin, Francis T. Cullen &
Cheryl Lero Jonson, eds. 2018).
277. See Schell-Busey et al., supra note 260, at 407.
278. Indictment at ¶ 15, United States v. Brown, No. 3:16-cr-00093-TCJ-JRK (M.D. Fla. July
6, 2016).
279. Former Congresswoman Corrine Brown Reports to Prison on Fraud, Other Charges, ATLANTA
J. CONST. (Jan. 28, 2018), https://www.ajc.com/news/national/former-congresswomancorrine-brown-reports-prison-fraud-other-charges/U8YLfFxAwNzRaqYl7lulZK/ [https://
perma.cc/K9NV-G62G].
280. 2017 CONFLICT SURVEY, supra note 183, at 7–8.
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fore an administrative judge. And, even then, the disciplined
employee can appeal.
Moreover, in the absence of formal legal or disciplinary consequences, government ethics regulators have a highly limited ability
to impose informal sanctions. With rare exceptions involving high282
profile figures, suspected offenders’ names are rarely publicized—either internally within the agency or externally—when no
formal punishment is meted out. Indeed, even publicly available
inspector general reports that recount wrongdoing within an
agency frequently redact or use aliases in place of the names of the
283
wrongdoers pursuant to the federal Privacy Act.
It is conceivable that the government’s massive ethics infrastructure may serve a deterrent effect not just by training and guiding
officials on proper compliance but also by serving as a metaphorical, visible “police presence.” As Daniel Nagin has explained,
“[T]here is substantial evidence that increasing the visibility of the
police by hiring more officers and allocating existing officers in
ways that materially heighten the perceived risk of apprehension
284
deters crimes.” But this is a highly imperfect analogy when applied to government ethics laws and rules because government ethics officials are not police or prosecutors. Their ability to pursue
wrongdoers is highly constrained, and their ability to punish
285
wrongdoers is nil. The simple fact that a governmental department might include an ethics office—even a large and expensive
one—is very different from a potential car thief who sees police
constantly patrolling a crime-ridden neighborhood. Moreover, the
286
deterrent effect of regulatory agencies is questionable.
As discussed above, in the exceptional cases where criminal
charges are brought, they usually operate as supplemental charges
287
to instances of blatant bribery or abuse of power. “Run-of-themill” ethics violations, even ones that implicate the criminal statutes, typically go unaddressed. If certainty of being caught is the

281. See, e.g., Mike Ivancie, Q & A with a Merit Systems Protection Board Representative,
IVANCIE L. (Feb. 12, 2016), https://www.ivancielaw.com/federal-employment-law/q-a-with-amerit-systems-protection-board-representative/ [https://perma.cc/T5YZ-KQ8Y].
282. See supra Section II.C (discussing Kellyanne Conway).
283. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a). See generally DEP’T OF DEFENSE, INSPECTOR GENERAL
INSTRUCTION 5400.11 (Jan. 29, 2010) (implementing the Privacy Act as applied to the Inspector General’s office); U.S. DEP’T OF INTERIOR, OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., Report No.
20-0099 (Sept. 1, 2020) (investigative report using aliases such as “GSA Official 1” in place of
names).
284. Nagin, supra note 245, at 158.
285. See discussion supra Part III.
286. See SIMPSON, supra note 267, at 98.
287. See supra Section III.D.
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key factor in deterrence, then there must be very little deterrence
indeed.
The complexity of the applicable rules also creates a barrier to
reliable compliance. One commentator, himself a government ethics lawyer, has argued:
Expecting new government employees to read these
rules—let alone understand and remember them—is akin
to expecting consumers to read and understand “clickthrough” licenses for new software. Even if read, there is also rarely any effort to test whether employees can recall or
understand the rules. Distributing a lengthy tome on the
rules of conduct—particularly if done along with a slew of
other documents and forms to be read and completed—is
an ineffective way to assure that employees know that they
288
are expected to behave ethically.
The same commentator has questioned the efficacy of ethics training programs in particular in fostering compliance with the rules:
Though good training can effectively transfer knowledge of
those rules that are malum prohibitum, the benefit in
terms of fostering ethics or reducing corruption is slim . . . .
Indeed, the lack of training or knowledge of the rules does
little to explain ethical failure. According to a 2005 ethics
survey, improper training or ignorance that a particular action was unethical is only the fifth most likely cause of ethical lapse, behind pressure to meet unrealistic goals, the desire for career enhancement, assuring continued
employment, and working in an environment with poor
289
morale.
B. The Limits of OGE
The central repository of ethics in the federal government is—or
is supposed to be—OGE. But OGE, as currently structured, focuses
almost entirely on preventing ethics violations rather than identifying and addressing past violations. OGE’s organization consists of
the Office of the Director, the Internal Operations Division, the
General Counsel and Legal Policy Division, the Program Counsel

288.
289.

Lager, supra note 12, at 73.
Id. at 74.
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290
Division, and the Compliance Division. All of these divisions deal
with compliance, education, and oversight of federal agency ethics
programs. 291 None of them focus on enforcement, investigation, or
auditing. Simply put, OGE is not equipped to be, and does not
function as, the ethics police of the federal government.
Should it? It is striking that the federal government has no division of investigation or enforcement with respect to government
ethics laws and rules. This is in marked contrast to various other
areas of federal regulation, which have dedicated agency enforcement. To give ten prominent examples:

•
•
•

•
•

The Securities and Exchange Commission’s Division of Enforcement investigates and prosecutes civil suits for viola292
tions of federal securities law.
The Federal Trade Commission’s Division of Enforcement
293
litigates a variety of consumer protection matters.
The Federal Communications Commission’s Enforcement
Bureau is “responsible for enforcing the provisions of the
Communications Act, the Commission’s rules, orders, and
294
various licensing terms and conditions.”
Different offices at the Environmental Protection Agency
pursue a variety of enforcement actions for violations of
295
environmental law.
The Commodity Futures Trading Commission’s Division of
Enforcement “investigates and prosecutes alleged violations of the Commodity Exchange Act . . . and Commission
296
regulations.”

290. Organization, supra note 67.
291. General Counsel & Legal Policy Division, U.S. OFF. OF GOV’T ETHICS, https://www2.
oge.gov/Web/OGE.nsf/Organization/General%20Counsel%20&%20Legal%20Policy%20
Division [https://perma.cc/L8SC-2D8S] (last visited Nov. 1, 2020); Program Counsel Division,
U.S. OFF. OF GOV’T ETHICS, https://www2.oge.gov/Web/OGE.nsf/Organization/Program
%20Counsel%20Division [https://perma.cc/DB76-YS8U] (last visited Nov. 1, 2020); Compliance Division, U.S. OFF. OF GOV’T ETHICS, https://www2.oge.gov/Web/OGE.nsf
/Organization/Compliance%20Division [https://perma.cc/4T4K-UXMU] (last visited Nov.
1, 2020).
292. Division of Enforcement, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/page
/enforcement-section-landing [https://perma.cc/EFC2-VA2R] (Nov. 1, 2020).
293. Division of Enforcement, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/bureausoffices/bureau-consumer-protection/our-divisions/division-enforcement [https://perma.cc
/7AEC-4BNE] (last visited Nov. 1, 2020).
294. Enforcement, FED. COMMC’N COMM’N, https://www.fcc.gov/enforcement [https:
//perma.cc/ZP9T-9E4H] (last visited Nov. 1, 2020).
295. Enforcement, U.S. ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/enforcement [https://
perma.cc/FT2T-SC6S] (last visited Nov. 1, 2020).
296. Enforcement, COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N, https://www.cftc.gov
/LawRegulation/Enforcement/index.htm [https://perma.cc/45BV-D9Q5] (last visited
Nov. 1, 2020).
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The Federal Election Commission’s Enforcement Division
“investigates alleged violations of the law, . . . directly negotiates conciliation agreements, which may include civil
penalties and other remedies,” and its Litigation Division
pursues enforcement actions in court. 297
The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission’s Office of
Enforcement “[i]nitiates and executes investigations of
possible violations of the Commission’s rules, orders, and
regulations” and “pursues remedies through negotiation
298
or litigation.”
The Federal Aviation Authority’s Enforcement Division
“initiates legal enforcement actions to address noncompli299
ance by regulated entities and persons.”
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s Office of
Enforcement and Removal Operations’s stated mission is
“[t]o identify, arrest, and remove aliens who present a
danger to national security or are a risk to public safety, as
well as those who enter the United States illegally or otherwise undermine the integrity of our immigration laws
300
and our border control efforts.”
The Department of Housing and Urban Development’s
Departmental Enforcement Center enforces “the Department’s statutory and regulatory requirements,” including
through “various sanctions, including suspension and debarment from Government business,” civil penalties,
“abat[ing] owners’ federal subsidy payments and, if neces301
sary, foreclos[ure] on properties.”

Ultimately, OGE is an almost uniquely powerless federal agency
in terms of its ability to enforce the laws it oversees. All of the regulatory agencies listed above have formal investigative authority, in
many cases including subpoena powers, and all have the ability to
litigate against alleged violators. OGE does not even have the abil-

297. Associate General Counsel for Enforcement, FED. ELECTION COMM’N, https://transition.
fec.gov/about/offices/OGC/AGC_enforcement.shtml#enf [https://perma.cc/QAQ5-8FP4]
(last visited Nov. 1, 2020).
298. Office of Enforcement, FED. ENERGY REGUL. COMM’N, https://www.ferc.gov/about/
offices/office-enforcement-oe [https://perma.cc/E5BA-GHXU] (last visited Nov. 1, 2020).
299. Legal Enforcement Actions, U.S. FED. AVIATION ADMIN., https://www.faa.gov/about
/office_org/headquarters_offices/agc/practice_areas/enforcement/enforcement_actions/
[https://perma.cc/ET4K-6ERU] (last visited Nov. 1, 2020).
300. Enforcement and Removal Operations, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF’T, https://www.ice
.gov/ero#wcm-survey-target-id [https://perma.cc/97CY-TNZE] (last visited Nov. 1, 2020).
301. DEC Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. DEPT. OF HOUS. & URB. DEV., DEPARTMENTAL
ENF’T CTR., https://www.hud.gov/program_offices/enforcement/faq [https://perma.cc
/565S-H5UT] (last visited Nov. 1, 2020).
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ity to require disciplinary action against a violator. It is quite unusual for an agency with primary oversight responsibility over a particular area of law and regulation, and the foremost expertise in
that area within the government, to have no enforcement power
whatsoever. OGE’s complete lack of enforcement authority and
highly limited independent investigative authority constrain its
302
ability to combat ethics violations.
Nor do federal agency ethics offices or agency inspectors general fill this gap. Agency ethics officials and inspectors general have
at most the ability to make recommendations. They have only the
authority to recommend to senior agency officials that disciplinary
action be taken against a violator. And they, like OGE, have no enforcement authority at all with respect to the ethics statutes; that
responsibility falls solely to the DOJ, which pursues criminal or
303
even civil actions only in exceptional cases.
One might counter that complaints about OGE’s limited enforcement and investigative powers misunderstand OGE’s purpose.
OGE does have significant rule-writing, educational, advisory, information-gathering, and public outreach functions.
But the question is whether the status quo is preferable to possible alternatives. Under current law and practice, OGE’s authority is
confined to advisory, educational, preventive, consultative, and
rulemaking functions. The limits of its power are illustrated by
former Director Shaub’s extraordinary tweetstorm and other pub304
lic statements critical of President Trump in early 2017. These
actions can reasonably be read as the head of an independent
agency chafing at the constraints of his office. Because Shaub had
little ability to take concrete action against what he perceived as a
flouting of the rules and norms of government ethics, he instead
took to Twitter to try to publicly shame—or at a minimum get the
attention of—both the President and the press through highly unusual sarcasm and criticism. Lacking a cudgel, OGE’s Director instead resorted to the megaphone through these attention-seeking
tactics.
Moreover, a highly decentralized system of agency-specific ethics
offices may not make sense for enforcing rules and laws that are
largely uniform across the executive branch. To the extent individual agencies are charged with enforcing ethics rules for their
particular employees, there is a risk of disparate enforcement and
punishment for the same violations. Not only is this potentially unfair, it is also legally risky for the government. An employee chal302.
303.
304.

See discussion supra Section II.A.
See discussion supra Sections II.B–C.
See supra Section II.A.
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lenging a disciplinary action, termination or otherwise, would certainly point to differing levels of punishment across agencies for
the same types of violations. This varied treatment could form the
basis for a challenge to the action before the Merit Systems Protec305
tion Board. It almost certainly would also lead to some allegations that the disparate treatment was based on the employee’s
306
membership in a protected class.
C. When Ethics Officials Do Have Power: A Brief Case Study
In government, as in life, leverage matters. And federal ethics officials’ leverage is at its strongest in one circumstance: when a presidential administration is seeking to nominate an individual for a
position requiring Senate confirmation. Under current executive
branch practice and procedures, the White House will not normally nominate someone until OGE has “precleared” that person’s financial disclosures. This means that before the President formally
nominates the candidate by submitting her name to the Senate,
the potential nominee will submit her draft 278e financial disclo307
sure form to the government. The draft 278e form is reviewed by
308
ethics officials at the nominee’s future agency and at OGE. One
309
hundred percent of the time, the ethics officials will have followup questions about the 278e, with inquiries about the person’s assets, income, and positions. Necessary edits are made to the draft
278e before it is finalized. From that finalized form, agency ethics
officials (often with input from OGE) will identify the asset divestitures, resignations, and other actions the future nominee must
310
take in order to avoid conflicts of interest.
Ethics officials, based on their review of the nominee’s financial
disclosures and perhaps other communications with the nominee,
will then draft an “ethics agreement” or “ethics letter” for the nom-

305. See generally Jurisdiction, U.S. MERIT SYS. PROT. BD., https://www.mspb.gov/About/
jurisdiction.htm [https://perma.cc/82PM-BZBZ] (last visited Jan. 10, 2021).
306. See generally Federal Employees & Job Applicants, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY
COMM’N, https://www.eeoc.gov/federal-sector/federal-employees-job-applicants [https://
perma.cc/PRW5-ME5V] (last visited Jan. 10, 2021).
307. U.S. OFF. OF GOV’T ETHICS, PUBLIC FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE GUIDE § 4.10 (2019),
https://www.oge.gov/Web/278eGuide.nsf/2cf9ac792bc0654a85257ea1005f838a/2bbfa649
c57bbcae85258361007016e0?OpenDocument [https://perma.cc/JX73-YH3B].
308. Id.
309. The one hundred percent number is an approximation but is consistent with the
author’s experience representing clients being considered for presidential appointments.
310. See 5 C.F.R. §§ 2634.801–805; Dale Christopher, Ethics Agreements: Where Ethics Obligations Become Action, U.S. OFF. OF GOV’T ETHICS (July 24, 2019), https://www.oge.gov/
web/oge.nsf/Resources/Ethics+Agreements:+Where+Ethics+Obligations+Become+Action
[https://perma.cc/B7E8-7TTB].
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311

inee’s signature. In this agreement, the future nominee affirms
her understanding of various ethics laws and rules, agrees to abide
by those laws and rules, and commits to take certain actions and
refrain from certain actions in order to ensure compliance. For
example, a letter may say: “Within 90 days of confirmation, I will
divest all my interests in Los Pollos Hermanos Company.” Or it
may say: “Upon confirmation, I will resign from my position as a
Director of Vandelay Industries.”
Only after the 278e form and the ethics agreement are finalized
to the satisfaction of OGE will OGE notify the White House that
312
the person has been precleared for nomination. Although the
White House is not legally prohibited from forwarding a nomination before preclearance, in practice all recent administrations
have been reluctant to do so.
Part of this leverage is based on OGE’s statutory authority with
respect to certification of nominee 278e reports. The Ethics in
Government Act provides that a nominee must submit a financial
313
disclosure statement within five days of her Senate nomination.
Moreover, the report must be made “current” no later than the
314
date of the nominee’s Senate confirmation hearing. OGE’s Director is then authorized to review the report and to determine
whether “the individual submitting such report is in compliance
315
with applicable laws and regulations.” If OGE’s review leads it to
conclude that “additional information is required to be submitted,
[it] shall notify the individual submitting such report what additional information is required and the time by which it must be
316
submitted.” OGE essentially has full independence in determin317
ing whether to certify a report—or not.
The same statute gives OGE equal authority to refuse to certify
the annual reports of officials already in government, but by that
point OGE’s leverage is mostly gone. For example, after identifying
inaccuracies in the Secretary of Commerce’s financial reporting
for 2018, OGE refused to certify his annual financial disclosure re318
port. But the Secretary remained in the job with no disciplinary
319
measures or direct adverse consequences to his role.
311. 5 C.F.R. §§ 2634.801–805 (2018). For DOJ nominees, the letter is signed by a senior
Department ethics official rather than by the nominee herself, but the nominee will separately confirm her commitment to abide by the terms of the letter.
312. U.S. OFF. OF GOV’T ETHICS, supra note 307, at §4.10.
313. 5 U.S.C. App. § 101(b)(1).
314. Id.
315. Id. § 106(b)(1).
316. Id. § 106(b)(2)(A).
317. Id. § 106(b)(2); 5 CFR § 2634.605(b)(3) (2018).
318. Letter from Emory A. Rounds, Dir., U.S. Off. of Gov’t Ethics, to David Maggi, Designated Agency Ethics Off. & Chief of the Ethics L. and Program Divs., Off. of the Gen.
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OGE’s power in this particular unique circumstance—its ability
to hold up a nominee for high office—provides broader lessons for
enhancing the clout of federal ethics officials generally. For example, if it identifies ethics violations by a particular official, OGE
could be given the authority to block an official’s promotion, or
even to enjoin her continued employment, pending resolution of
the issue. An affected official could be afforded due process protections similar to those allowed through the Merit Systems Protection Board, but giving OGE the authority to prevent an agency
from promoting or continuing to employ a rule-breaking official,
would make it a significantly more powerful organization.
D. Proposed Reforms
While criticisms of the existing federal ethics regime abound, actual detailed reform proposals are harder to find. Indeed, the presidential ethics pledges are notable for how they only incrementally
expand federal officials’ existing ethics obligations, and how they
320
are virtually never enforced.
When reforms to the existing laws and rules have been proposed, they have tended to be either marginal changes to existing
substantive ethics standards, or—in clear response to widely reported perceived abuses—focused on the President’s individual
ethical obligations. Most reform proposals have not focused on the
federal system of ethics compliance and enforcement.
For example, in 2018, Senator and then-presidential candidate
Elizabeth Warren proposed the Anti-Corruption and Public Integ321
rity Act. The ethics component of the Act would do such things
as “require senior government officials and White House staff to
divest from privately-owned assets that could present conflicts, including large companies and commercial real estate,” and “require
most executive branch employees to recuse from all issues that
might financially benefit themselves or a previous employer or cli-

Couns. (Feb. 15, 2019), https://www2.oge.gov/web/OGE.nsf/0/955C1F75C94F1D1
F852583A60074C4CB/$FILE/Letter%20to%20Commerce%20DAEO.pdf [https://
perma.cc/L7Q7-FN8R].
319. See e.g., Carrie Levine, ‘Not In Compliance’: Wilbur Ross, The Trump Official Who Keeps
Watchdogs Up at Night, NPR (Feb. 27, 2019), https://www.npr.org/2019/02/27/696824206/
not-in-compliance-wilbur-ross-the-trump-official-who-keeps-watchdogs-up-at-night [https://
perma.cc/BYA8-U543].
320. See supra Sections I.C, III.C.
321. Anti-Corruption and Public Integrity Act, WARREN.SENATE.GOV, https://www.warren.
senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Master%20Summary%20of%20Anti%20Corruption%20Act
%20-%20FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/465N-NJAS] (last visited Nov. 1, 2020) (bill summary).
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ent from the preceding 4 years.” The former proposal is essentially identical to the existing financial conflict of interest statute,
18 U.S.C. § 208, and the latter simply extends OGE’s impartiality
rule as applied to officials’ former employers from one year to four
323
years.
Likewise, a report from the Brennan Center for Justice advocated for closing “the loophole exempting the president and vice
president from the general standards of conduct established under
federal conflict of interest law” and expanding financial disclosure
324
requirements for senior officials, particularly the President. As
noted above, the presidential exemption to the conflict-of-interest
325
laws has only been a significant issue for a single President, and
financial disclosure requirements under current law are already
quite burdensome.
Former OGE Director Walter Shaub himself has advanced a
326
number of reform proposals. For example, he argues for changing the law so that the President may only remove OGE’s Director
327
for cause. Though a potentially effective prophylactic measure to
safeguard the agency’s independence, it would address a threat
that is more theoretical than real. In practice, agency ethics officials and others who deal with OGE know that it already does operate as a quite self-contained and fiercely independent agency,
and its employees—composed almost entirely of career officials rather than political appointees—tend to jealously guard the Office’s
mission and prerogatives. Indeed, the possibility that Shaub himself would be fired did not stop him from going to war with the
328
White House in 2017.
Shaub also argues for the establishment of “a Special Inspector
General for Small Executive Agencies . . . with regular jurisdiction
over the many small agencies in the executive branch that lack Inspectors General and special jurisdiction to conduct ethics investi329
gations.” But this is essentially a gap-filling measure to cover the
small minority of federal agency employees who are not subject to
the dozens of existing inspectors general.

322. Id. at 1.
323. See supra Section I.A (discussing 18 U.S.C. §208).
324. DANIEL I. WEINER, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., STRENGTHENING PRESIDENTIAL ETHICS
LAW 7–8 (2017), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/2019-08/Report_
Strengthening%20Presidential%20Ethics%20Law.%20Daniel%20Weiner.pdf [https://
perma.cc/C9DY-YZJ2].
325. See supra Section I.A.
326. See Shaub, supra note 117, at 1.
327. Id. at 3.
328. See supra Section II.A.
329. Shaub, supra note 117, at 13–14.
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Shaub also supports increased public access to such information
as officials’ compliance with ethics rules, use of government aircraft, officials’ interest in discretionary trusts, and the ethics transi330
tion plans of presidential candidates. But again, these changes
would all be marginal adjustments to requirements already in
place.
One exception to the trend toward incremental reform is the
advocacy group Issue One, which has proposed several potentially
major changes to the Executive Branch ethics program. One would
be to “[a]uthorize OGE to investigate allegations of ethics violations for high-ranking employees (Presidential appointments with
331
and without Senate confirmation, SES and Schedule C).” As discussed in Section II.A, OGE already has the authority to investigate
any agency employee of any level, at least when the Director determines that an agency investigation “has not been conducted
332
The regulation itself, though,
within a reasonable time.”
acknowledges that it will be a “rare case” in which these procedures
333
prove necessary. A reform that allows OGE to self-initiate investigations of high-level officials, without first having to go through
agency ethics officers, could streamline the process and make it
more regularized.
Perhaps more profoundly, Issue One also proposes additional
investigative powers for OGE: “Clarify that the Director of OGE has
the authority to conduct investigations, subpoena witnesses, compel production of documents and issue civil penalties for violations
334
for high-ranking officials.” This would be a significant change
because OGE does not currently have subpoena power or any other way to compel documents from government officials or anyone
else. Likewise, neither OGE nor agency ethics officials have the
power to issue civil penalties for violations of ethics rules.
Another pair of recommendations would allow OGE to engage
in random oversight of agency ethics offices and individual employees.
First, Issue One recommends that rules be changed to
“[a]uthorize OGE to conduct random reviews of decisions by eth335
ics officials for each agency.” To allow random reviews of agency
ethics decisions would, in part, allow OGE to function as an overall

330. Id. at 17–25.
331. Memorandum from Issue One to Ed. Bds. 6 (May 23, 2017), https://www.issueone.
org/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/IO-OGE-Edit-Memo-2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/837X2YPQ].
332. 5 C.F.R. § 2638.504(b) (2017).
333. Id. § 2638.504.
334. Memorandum from Issue One to Ed. Bds., supra note 331, at 2.
335. Id. at 7.
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inspector general for the federal executive branch. Or, in effect,
act as an inspector general to inspectors general, insofar as agency
IG offices themselves play a role in policing employee ethics. But
ultimately, if OGE cannot override those decisions, its role is limited
to a hortatory one and is duplicative of agency inspectors general,
who can already effectively do the same thing when notified of a
problem.
Second, Issue One recommends: “Authorize OGE to conduct
random audits of public and confidential financial disclosures to
336
ensure the accuracy of the document.” To allow random audits
of financial disclosure reports would allow OGE to function as an
IRS for federal employees. In practice, agency ethics officials tend
to pay close attention to the financial disclosure reports of highlevel agency officials. But even in those instances where ethics officials review and provide feedback and questions on an official’s
public financial disclosure report, they almost never ask for actual
documentation of an employee’s assets and income. Agency ethics
officials do not have subpoena or formal audit power over agency
employees. It is questionable whether a reform that gives OGE the
power to randomly and formally audit federal officials’ financial
statements would substantially deter officials from engaging in
wrongdoing. Moreover, financial disclosure is already by far the
most onerous ethics requirement for executive branch employees
337
from a compliance standpoint.
As for avoiding and deterring financial conflicts of interest, perhaps a more effective solution would be to facilitate information
sharing between the IRS and OGE. Under current law, the IRS is
generally prohibited from sharing individuals’ tax information out338
side the agency, including with other government agencies. Tax
return information can be shared with other federal agencies for a
339
variety of purposes if the necessary conditions are met, but none
of these exceptions expressly allow the IRS to share return information with OGE or agency ethics officials for the purpose of de340
termining whether the employees have violated ethics rules. A

336.
337.
338.
339.
340.

Id.
See supra Section II.D.
26 U.S.C. § 6103(a).
See id. § 6103(h)–(l).
The closest exception is a section that allows disclosure to

officers and employees of any Federal agency who are personally and directly engaged in . . . preparation for any judicial or administrative proceeding pertaining
to the enforcement of a specifically designated Federal criminal statute (not involving tax administration) to which the United States or such agency is or may be
a party, or . . . any investigation which may result in such a proceeding.
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change in the law to allow OGE to request information from the
IRS could go a long way toward ensuring that officials are not reporting one thing to tax authorities—which do have broad investigative and enforcement powers—and another to ethics authorities.
Another set of reform proposals comes from the National Task
Force on the Rule of Law & Democracy, an initiative of the Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of Law that is co-chaired by
former New Jersey Governor Christine Todd Whitman and former
Southern District of New York United States Attorney Preet Bharara. As part of a broader set of public policy reforms, the Task
341
Force sets forth six proposals regarding government ethics.
Three of the proposals deal with financial disclosure; one advocates stricter means for enforcing the Emoluments Clauses of the
Constitution; and one advocates extending the federal conflict of
342
interest laws to the President and Vice-President. As with some
other reform proposals discussed above, these proposals target issues specific to President Trump.
The Task Force’s sixth proposal, however, focuses on a series of
reforms to OGE. The first such reform would be to “[s]pecify that
the president cannot remove OGE’s director during his or her
343
statutory term except for good cause.” As mentioned, though,
OGE already functions as a highly independent agency and the
threats to that independence have been purely hypothetical. But
perhaps more significantly, the Task Force recommends a number
of other changes to enhance OGE’s authority, including expanded
344
investigative and enforcement power. As discussed later in Section IV.F, these types of reforms, if implemented, would be more
likely to have widespread deterrent effects.
Finally, in early 2019, the newly installed Democratic majority of
345
the House of Representatives passed H.R. 1, a wide-ranging series
of changes to federal election and ethics laws. Most of the ethics
sections of the bill dealt with the President, Congress, the courts,
Id. § 6103(i)(A). However, criminal statutes are only a subset of the federal ethics infrastructure. Moreover, OGE and agency ethics officials are expressly prohibited from “mak[ing] a
finding as to whether . . . any . . . criminal law of the United States . . . has been or is being
violated.” 5 C.F.R. § 2638.502 (2018). Accordingly, it is doubtful whether the IRS currently
has the ability to share federal officials’ tax return information with OGE, or for that matter
any agency ethics officials.
341. PREET BHARARA, CHRISTINE TODD WHITMAN, MIKE CASTLE, CHRISTOPHER EDLEY, JR.,
CHUCK HAGEL, DAVID IGLESIAS, AMY COMSTOCK RICK, DONALD B. VERRILLI, JR., NAT’L TASK
FORCE ON RULE OF L. & DEMOCRACY, PROPOSALS FOR REFORM 4–15 (2018), https:
//www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/2019-08/Report_TaskForceReport_2018_
09.pdf [https://perma.cc/NKK6-YWXN].
342. Id. at 5–10.
343. Id. at 13.
344. Id. at 13, 15.
345. H.R. 1, 116th Cong. (2019).
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and lobbying disclosure. One section of the bill, however, titled
the Executive Branch Comprehensive Ethics Enforcement Act of
347
2019, addressed OGE. In addition to reauthorizing the office,
the bill also would have made the Director removable only for
cause and clarified OGE’s rights with respect to ethics matters in
348
the White House. But perhaps most significantly in the long run,
the bill would have enhanced OGE’s investigative authority by giv349
ing it subpoena power. The Senate never took up H.R. 1.
E. A Modest Reform: Ethical “Sentencing Guidelines”
As discussed in Section IV.A.1 of this Article, the certainty of
punishment is a key factor in the deterrence of wrongdoing.
Where punishment, if any, for a given violation is uncertain, people will feel less incentive to comply with the rule in question than
if they know that breaking it will lead to a specific consequence.
And that is exactly the case for disciplinary violations of government ethics rules. In the rare cases where wrongdoing leads to discipline, the severity of punishment can vary across and within
agencies.
One possible stopgap solution to the decentralized and sometimes haphazard enforcement of ethics rules is for OGE to issue
“sentencing guidelines” for various violations of ethics rules. A uniform set of prescribed punishments for ethical breaches, applicable across the executive branch, would provide guidance for agency ethics officials and other officials as to how to respond to
identified violations.
Such guidelines could be issued as a legal advisory or as formal
rulemaking. Since OGE frequently issues legal advisories on a host
of topics relating to government ethics laws and rules, guidance on
the proper level of punishment for violations might be welcome.
350
OGE has express statutory authority to issue such opinions. A
counterargument might be that these advisories do not have any
force of law, and an employee subject to sanction under the OGE
disciplinary guidelines might challenge it as such.
A formal act of rulemaking would be a much more significant
undertaking, as it would require OGE to engage in a notice-andcomment period and other requirements under the Administrative

346.
347.
348.
349.
350.

Id. tit. VII–X.
Id. tit. VIII, subtit. D.
Id. §§ 8032–34.
Id. § 8034(d)(2)(B).
5 U.S.C. app. § 402(b)(8).
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Procedure Act. OGE does, however, engage in significant formal
rulemaking, most recently in its amendments to the outside gift
351
rule, which went into effect at the start of 2017.
OGE likely has the statutory authority to issue guidelines for appropriate disciplinary levels through formal rulemaking. The Ethics in Government Act provides that OGE’s Director is responsible
for “developing . . . rules and regulations to be promulgated by the
President or the Director pertaining to conflicts of interest and
352
ethics in the executive branch.”
Disciplinary guidelines could be detailed and focus not only on
the type of violation but also its severity. These are analogous to
the so-called Douglas factors generally used in federal Merit Systems
Protection Board employment cases to determine if the discipli353
nary sanction imposed on an employee is appropriate. For example, the disciplinary level for a violation of the gift rule could be
based on some of these factors:
•
•
•
•
•
•

The value of the prohibited gift.
Whether the employee actively solicited the gift.
Whether there was a clear and deliberate connection between the employee’s official position and the gift.
Whether the employee did anything in his official capacity
in return for the gift.
Whether the employee sought advice from ethics officials
or others before accepting the gift.
Whether this is a repeat offense.

Likewise, the disciplinary level for a violation of the financial conflict of interest rule could consider the following factors:
•
•
•
•

The value of the conflicting asset.
Whether the asset is owned personally by the employee or
is imputed through the ownership of another person.
Whether the employee took any action that was likely to
enhance the value of the conflicting asset.
The actual or expected financial effect of the employee’s
actions or decisions on the affected asset.

351. Standards of Ethical Conduct for Employees of the Executive Branch; Amendment
to the Standards Governing Solicitation and Acceptance of Gifts from Outside Sources, 81
Fed. Reg. 81,641 (Nov. 18, 2016).
352. 5 U.S.C. app. §402(b)(1).
353. See Douglas v. Veterans Admin., 5 M.S.P.B. 313 (1981); Determining the Penalty, U.S.
MERIT SYS. PROT. BD., https://www.mspb.gov/studies/adverse_action_report/10_
DeterminingthePenalty.htm [https://perma.cc/5T5W-9MMP] (last visited Nov. 1, 2020).
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Whether the employee sought advice from ethics officials
or others before accepting the gift.
Whether this is a repeat offense.

As detailed above, possible disciplinary actions that can be imposed
on an employee include “reprimand, suspension, demotion, and
removal.” 354 There is less of a continuous spectrum in disciplinary
actions than there is for criminal or civil penalties, where monetary
fines, prison sentences, and length of probation can be adjusted
upward or downward with mathematical precision. Among the
types of discipline, there could be some variation in the length of a
suspension or the severity of a demotion, though there are limits.
Once a suspension becomes long enough, it is effectively equivalent to termination. Similarly, a person can only be demoted up to
a point; it is not practical to demote a senior agency executive to
the custodial staff.
F. An Immodest Reform: Empower Federal Ethics Officials to
Investigate and Enforce Ethics Standards
The foregoing discussion has shown that (1) criminal and civil
enforcement actions for violations of government ethics laws are
rare and typically take years, (2) agency disciplinary measures
against employees are also quite uncommon, (3) ethics officials at
OGE and individual agencies have very limited investigative authority and no enforcement authority, and, finally, (4) punishment
for wrongdoing that is unlikely and slow in coming does not act as
an effective deterrent.
One solution to this conundrum is to create a more focused and
streamlined enforcement process for ethics rules and to confer
that authority upon an agency with a specific focus on the laws and
355
rules in question. This agency could either be a new “investigation and enforcement division” within OGE, or—as considered below—a separate and independent ethics agency. The agency could
be called, for instance, the Ethics Investigation and Enforcement
Agency (EIEA).
First, EIEA could be given the investigative tools that other law
enforcement agencies have: in particular, the ability to conduct
audits, issue subpoenas, and compel testimony. Some of this power

354. 5 C.F.R. § 2635.102(g) (2020).
355. Some of the potential reforms discussed in this section share common elements
with high-level proposals by the National Task Force on the Rule of Law & Democracy. See
BHARARA ET AL., supra note 341, at 13, 15.
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would be duplicative of the current authority of agency inspectors
general, but the EIEA would be dedicated solely to government
ethics violations, unlike the broader mandate of inspectors general, and would investigate possible violations across the executive
branch rather than focus on a single agency as inspectors general
do.
Second, and even more radically, the EIEA could be given the
authority to directly impose discipline on federal officials, notwithstanding any action—or lack thereof—taken by the official’s own
employing agency. This would be an extension of OGE’s existing,
but rarely exercised, authority to independently recommend disci356
plinary action: the EIEA could override a decision by the employee’s own superiors not to impose discipline. And, after due
process, the EIEA could actually impose the discipline itself. These
consequences could include, potentially, demotion, suspension, or
termination. The employee, if a career official, could then challenge such an action through the Merit Systems Protection Board,
just as if the employee had been disciplined by his own agency.
To be sure, if the EIEA has the independent authority to impose
discipline on an official of the Executive Branch even when the official’s own agency declines to do so, it could lead to inter-agency
disputes. Imagine, for instance, if the Office of Special Counsel
had directly been able to fire, rather than just recommend the fir357
ing of, Kellyanne Conway, contrary to the White House’s wishes.
Beyond that, actions to discipline high-level—even potentially Cabinet-level—officials could lead to immense public attention and
raise Constitutional questions with respect to political appointees.
These possibilities weigh in favor of a narrow construction of the
ethics agency’s disciplinary power to cover only instances where
the violations of specific ethics standards are clear-cut and the ethics agency has a good faith basis to believe that the other agency’s
response has been inadequate. In fact, the knowledge that EIEA
may second-guess the laxity of an agency’s response to an ethical
violation might also spur agency officials themselves to be more
vigilant about addressing wrongdoing by their employees.
One step further would be to allow EIEA to pursue civil penalties for significant violations. This power could take two general
forms, not mutually exclusive to each other. First, EIEA could be
authorized to impose fines through internal administrative actions,
perhaps allowing a hearing before an administrative judge. A

356.
357.

5 C.F.R. §§ 2635.501, 504 (2002).
See supra Section II.C.
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number of federal agencies, such as the SEC, the FEC, the
360
361
362
EPA, the FCC, and FERC, have power to impose fines
through administrative actions.
Second, EIEA could be permitted to bring civil enforcement ac363
tions in court, as many other federal agencies do. All five agencies mentioned above, among others, have the authority to bring
civil actions in court against violators of the laws that they respec364
tively enforce. In addition to referring violations to the DOJ—
which, as shown above, rarely leads to prosecution—agency ethics
officials could also refer such cases to the EIEA for civil enforcement actions.
Importantly, EIEA’s authority to impose civil penalties would
have to go beyond the employee’s federal employment; otherwise
many violators could—and would—avoid the penalties simply by
resigning their positions. Accordingly, EIEA’s jurisdiction would
have to extend to former executive branch employees. This expansion of power would not necessarily be so drastic: for example,
OGE currently has the authority to require former officials to file
“termination” financial disclosure reports within 30 days of their
365
departure.
Any of these changes would require either substantial changes to
OGE’s statutory authority, structure, and professional staff, or the
creation of a completely new agency. Enforcement attorneys and
litigators, and perhaps administrative judges, would have to be
hired. It would be a considerable expansion of OGE’s current
358. See Administrative Proceedings, U.S. SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov
/litigation/admin.shtml [https://perma.cc/H3KA-ZK2J] (last visited Nov. 1, 2020).
359. See 11 C.F.R. §§ 111.30–46; Administrative Fines, FED. ELECTION COMM’N, https:
//www.fec.gov/legal-resources/enforcement/administrative-fines/ [https://perma.cc
/3G49-UPXR] (last visited Nov. 1, 2020).
360. See Basic Information on Enforcement, U.S. ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov
/enforcement/basic-information-enforcement [https://perma.cc/R7LR-MM5F] (last visited Nov. 1, 2020).
361. See Enforcement Primer, FED. COMMC’N. COMM’N, https://www.fcc.gov/general
/enforcement-primer [https://perma.cc/F7FC-J9KY] (last visited Nov. 1, 2020).
362. See Civil Penalties, U.S. FED. ENERGY REGUL COMM’N, https://www.ferc.gov
/enforcement-legal/enforcement/civil-penalties [https://perma.cc/R4PM-DERR].
363. See also WEINER, supra note 324, at 9 (“It is also essential that OGE or another body
be given real civil enforcement authority parallel to that of most other independent regulatory agencies.”).
364. See Litigation Releases, U.S. SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/litigation
/litreleases.shtml [https://perma.cc/4CJS-H9QA] (last visited Nov. 1, 2020); Court Cases,
U.S. FED. ELECTION COMM’N, https://www.fec.gov/legal-resources/court-cases/ [https://
perma.cc/453P-CJW9] (last visited Nov. 1, 2020); Basic Information on Enforcement, U.S. ENV’T
PROT. AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/enforcement/basic-information-enforcement
[https://perma.cc/PTG8-6T3L] (last visited Nov. 1, 2020); Orders to Show Cause Proceedings,
FED. ENERGY REGUL. COMM’N, https://www.ferc.gov/enforcement-legal/enforcement/civilpenalties/orders-show-cause-proceedings [https://perma.cc/22MR-FJ4N] (last visited Jan.
10, 2021).
365. 5 U.S.C. app. 4 § 101(e); 5 C.F.R. § 2634.201(e) (2020).
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makeup of compliance and advisory attorneys. But if visible and efficient enforcement is an important component of deterrence, it
could be a worthwhile investment.
CONCLUSION: A SOLUTION IN SEARCH OF A PROBLEM?
One question is whether a dramatic expansion of the investigative and enforcement powers of federal ethics officials is really
necessary. What purpose would it serve? It is unknown and perhaps
unknowable whether the current ethics infrastructure is largely
successful in preventing and, where necessary, addressing violations of government ethics rules. But the application of deterrence
theory to the federal ethics regime strongly suggests that many violations are going undetected or at least unpunished.
Of course, just because OGE and agency ethics officials are unable to directly enforce ethics statutes does not make those laws irrelevant. The DOJ has the authority to bring civil and criminal ac366
That authority, however, is
tions for violating these laws.
exercised in only exceptional cases—approximately ten such actions per year over the past decade, and almost invariably as a peripheral component of a larger case involving bribery or other blatant criminality. The scant level of enforcement—quite
reasonably—undermines public confidence that the laws are effective.
To be sure, not every technical violation of ethics laws should
lead to criminal or civil enforcement. This is particularly the case
for financial disclosure misreporting because the reporting requirements are complex and amendments due to inadvertent errors are extremely common. Just as amendments to IRS returns
rarely lead to criminal tax evasion charges, fixes to financial disclosures should not necessarily mandate punishment.
Or, take the example of the former Director of the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention, who resigned from her position in
2018 when it was discovered she had improperly purchased shares
367
in tobacco, drug, and food companies while in office. The trades
in question were a very small part of her net worth and may have
been made by a portfolio manager trading on her behalf without
368
her advance knowledge. In such a case, where there was no evi366. See supra Section II.C; 18 U.S.C. § 216 (prescribing DOJ’s authority to bring criminal and civil enforcement actions for violations of various ethics statutes).
367. Sheila Kaplan, Dr. Brenda Fitzgerald, C.D.C. Director, Resigns Over Tobacco and Other
Investments, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 31, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/31/health/cdcbrenda-fitzgerald-resigns.html [https://perma.cc/RVP3-RGYL].
368. Id.
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dent corruption or concealment, and the official lost her job as a
result of the activity, little purpose would be served by additional
legal proceedings.
The current system is arguably the worst of all worlds: substantial
government resources, and the time of all affected government
employees and would-be employees, are devoted to technical compliance, while actual disciplinary measures are rare and direct enforcement of the various supposedly important criminal statutes is
even rarer. At the same time, the public’s perception—correct or
not—that government officials are not playing by the rules has only
increased. To mix a playground metaphor, a tilt in the compliance
and enforcement seesaw more toward the latter’s seat could paradoxically help the public believe—correctly—that the playing field
is a level one.

